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Abstract
This Comment analyzes U.S. and Russian bilateral cooperation in fighting organized crime
and the difficulties associated with this fight. Part I of this Comment presents the historical devel-
opment of Russian organized crime, its domestic effects, and its internationalization, particularly
in the United States. Part I also highlights the Russian government’s legislative attempts to combat
organized crime. Finally, Part I examines examples of international bilateral cooperation, such as
that between Israel and the United States, which can be emulated by the Russian and U.S. author-
ities. Part II analyzes the existing Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (“MLAA”) between the
United States and the Russian Federation, and examines existing as well as potential methods of
cooperation between the two governments in combating organized crime. Part II also analyzes the
problems that thwart increased cooperation. Finally, Part III of this Comment argues that ratifying
and putting into force a mutual legal assistance treaty (“MLAT”) between Russia and the United
States will significantly affect the spread of Russian organized crime in the Russian Federation,
the United States, and globally.
U.S.-RUSSIAN MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY:
IS THERE A WAY TO CONTROL
RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME?
Eugene Solomonov*
Two contract killers patiently wait at a doomed businessman's
doorstep. "Hey, Kolya, the man is late," one finally says,
clutching his pistol. One hour later, the other says, "Hey
Vanya, I'm getting worried. What if something bad hap-
pened to him?"'
INTRODUCTION
Vyacheslav Ivankov, nicknamed Yaponchik,2 was born in the
Russian city of Vladivostok.3 He got his start in organized crime
in the 1960s in a criminal group led by the famous criminal
nicknamed Mongol, and quickly became notorious for extorting
money from underground Soviet4 millionaires, such as shop-
keepers, government bribe-takers, and factory directors.5 In the
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helping me to write this Comment. I also acknowledge Alison Wong and the law firm
of Coudert Brothers for helping me to locate materials used in this Comment. I
dedicate this Comment to the memory of my grandparents, Benyumin and Lenina
Modelevskiy. Unless indicated otherwise, all Russian translations herein provided by
the author.
1. Sergei Shargorodsky, Year After Reporter's Death, Major Slayings Remain Unsolved in
Russia, ASSOCtATED PRESS, Oct. 17, 1995, available in 1995 WL 4410487. Contract kill-
ings in Russia happen so often that they no longer surprise anybody or attract much
attention. Id. Few of these crimes are ever solved. Id.
2. See Office of International Criminal Justice, Crime & Justice Europe, Top Vor
Nabbed by FBI (visited Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.acsp.uic.edu/OICJ/pubs/cje/050410.
htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating that Ivankov reached
top of criminal hierarchy through merciless methods of extortion and manipulation of
legal system in former Soviet Union). Yaponchik in Russian means the Little Japanese.
Id. It is unclear how Ivankov received this nickname. Id. Some believe that it was due
to the Asian cast to Ivankov's eyes, while others think that it was derived from the name
of another criminal nicknamed Yaponchik, who engaged in criminal activities in the
1920s. Id.
3. Id.
4. See WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL LAw DICTIONARY 2179 (1986) (defining So-
viet as "of or relating to, or associated with the U.S.S.R. or its inhabitants"). Russian is
defined as "of or relating to Russia, its inhabitants, or their language." Id. at 1991.
5. Office of International Criminal Justice, supra note 2. See Candace Sutton, More
Evil Than the Mafia, SUN HERALD, June 1, 1997, at 56 (stating that young Ivankov served
as enforcer for Mongol); see also Lee Hockstader, Russia's Criminal Condition; Gangsters
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mid-1970s, the Soviet authorities arrested, tried, and sentenced
Ivankov to five years in prison,6 where he was honored to be-
come a vor v zakone,7 the highest level of the criminal hierarchy
in the former Soviet Union.8 Later, Ivankov organized his own
criminal group.9 In 1981, the authorities again tried Ivankov
and sentenced him to fourteen years in prison, 10 but released
him in 1991 after members of the Parliament and the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation petitioned for his freedom. 1
Shortly after Soviet authorities released Ivankov from
prison, a consortium of Russian organized crime leaders chose
Ivankov to go to the United States and establish criminal enter-
prises there. 2 He admitted to one New York newspaper that he
was authorized to bring order to U.S. immigrant circles. 3 Ac-
Spreading Web from Moscow to the West, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1995, at Al (explaining how
Ivankov's victims, fearing for their lives, were reluctant to contact police authorities).
6. Office of International Criminal Justice, supra note 2.
7. See Joseph D. Serio & Vyacheslav Stepanovich Razinkin, Thieves Professing the
Code: The Traditional Role of Voy v Zakone in Russia's Criminal World and Adoptions to a
New Social Reality, Crime and Justice International, Crime & Justice Europe (visited
Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.acsp.uic.edu/OICJ/pubs/cje/050405.htm> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal) (noting that vor v zakone, thief professing code, is
position of great authority in Russian criminal world). A Vor v zakone's behavior is
guided by the special criminal code (vorovskoy zakon). Id. His authority includes the
organization of criminal enterprise and its activity, arbitration and settlement of dis-
putes between different groups, and sanctioning of code violators. Id. According to
official sources, there are around 400 vory v zakone in Russia and 700 in the former
Soviet Union. Id.; see also Hockstader, supra note 5, at Al (reporting how vory v zakone
were "antithesis of the Soviet system"). Vorovskoy zakon prevented thieves from working,
having spouses and children, or serving in the army. Hockstader, supra.
8. See Serio & Razinkin, supra note 7 (noting that vor v zakone is more than merely
leader of criminal organization).
9. See Office of International Criminal Justice, supra note 2 (noting that Ivankov's
group consisted primarily of athletes); see also Sutton, supra note 5, at 56 (noting that
Ivankov was popular due to his anticommunist stance).
10. Office of International Criminal Justice, supra note 2; see Hockstader, supra
note 5, at Al (stating that Ivankov's prison sentence was close to maximum term al-
lowed by Soviet law). Ivankov turned himself in after he was involved in a fierce
shootout with undercover police in 1980 in Moscow. Id.
11. See Hockstader, supra note 5, at Al (reporting that Ivankov's prison record
was terrible). Svyatoslav Fyodorov, member of the Russian Parliament, and Anatoly
Merkushev, the deputy chairman of Russia's Supreme Court, both played a role in
Ivankov's early release from prison. Id.; see also Sutton, supra note 5, at 56 (noting that
intellectuals and prominent Russian persons signed petition to support Ivankov's re-
lease from prison).
12. Douglas Farah, Russian Mob, Drug Cartels Joining Forces; Money-Laundering, Arms
Sales Spreading Across Caribbean, WASH. PosT, Sept. 29, 1997, at Al.
13. Office of International Criminal Justice, supra note 2.
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cording to federal authorities, Ivankov was also responsible for
extending the reach of Russian organized crime to Miami.14
In a mid-1993 interview with CJ Europe,' 5 Jim Moody, head
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's16 ("FBI") Organized
Crime Control Department, predicted that the FBI was going to
eventually arrest Ivankov, even if it was going to take some
time. 17 Moody's prediction eventually turned out to be correct,
as on June 8, 1995, FBI agents arrested Ivankov in New York.18
U.S. authorities charged Ivankov with masterminding a US$3.5
million extortion racket against Summit International, an invest-
ment firm owned by two Russian businessmen.' 9 Ivankov was
charged with violent intimidation directed at the owners of the
firm.20 The businessmen were approached in 1994, told that
14. See Farah, supra note 12, at Al (stating that in Miami, Ivankov frequently visited
nightclub called Porky, which is owned by another Russian mobster, Ludwig Fainberg).
In February 1997, Ludwig Fainberg was arrested for planning the sale of at least two
Soviet military helicopters to the Cali Colombian drug cartel. Id. They were also alleg-
edly negotiating the sale of a diesel patrol submarine for moving cocaine from Colom-
bia to the United States. Id.
15. See Office of International Criminal Justice (visited Aug. 17, 1999) <http://
www.acsp.uic.edu/OICJ/PUBS/cje0505.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) (defining purpose and activities of CJ Europe). CJ Europe is ajournal that
is published six times a year by the European Division of the Office of International
Criminal Justice, in affiliation with the Office of International Criminal Justice at the
University of Illinois at Chicago. Id.
16. See Federal Bureau of Investigation (visited Aug. 15, 1999) <http://www.fbi.
gov> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (describing agency's structure,
activities, and major investigations). The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"),
founded in 1908, is the principal investigative agency of the U.S. Department ofJustice.
Id. It has the authority and responsibility to investigate specific crimes assigned to it.
Id. The FBI is also authorized to provide other law enforcement agencies with coopera-
tive services, such as fingerprint identification, laboratory examinations, and police
training. Id. As of October 1998, the FBI had approximately 11,400 Special Agents and
16,400 Professional Support Personnel, and had a Fiscal Year 1999 budget of US$3.5
billion. Id. The current director of the FBI is Louis J. Freeh. Id.
17. Office of International Criminal Justice, supra note 2.
18. See Stephen Handelman, Russian Crime Boss Arrested in Brooklyn; FBI Calls Case
Key Blow Against Gangster Web, TORONTO STAR, June 9, 1995, at A2 (reporting that five of
Ivankov's associates were charged in same case).
19. See Laurence Peter, FBI Chief Plays Down Threat from Russian Criminals in US,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov. 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13437512 (reporting that at
that time FBI believed Ivankov's capture to be most important arrest in war against
Russian organized crime in United States).
20. Richard Pyle, Russian Mob Boss Sentenced; Gets 9 3/4 Years for Extortion Plot, Associ-
ATED PREss, Jan. 30, 1997, at All. Intimidation used against Alexander Volkov and
Vladimir Voloshin, the owners of Summit International, included the kidnapping and
slaying of Voloshin's father in Moscow in 1995. Id.
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they could avoid complications by paying sums ranging from
US$2.7 million to US$5 million for protection, and, under du-
ress, agreed to pay US$3.5 million. 21 U.S. and Russian law en-
forcement officials worked long and hard together to build a
strong case against the powerful Russian criminal leader.22
Through cooperation, they were able to achieve something that
was unrealistic just a very short time ago.28
This Comment analyzes U.S. and Russian bilateral coopera-
tion in fighting organized crime and the difficulties associated
with this fight. Part I of this Comment presents the historical
development of Russian organized crime, its domestic effects,
and its internationalization, particularly in the United States.
Part I also highlights the Russian government's legislative at-
tempts to combat organized crime. Finally, Part I examines ex-
amples of international bilateral cooperation, such as that be-
tween Israel and the United States, which can be emulated by
the Russian and U.S. authorities. Part II analyzes the existing
Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement 24 ("MLAA") between the
United States and the Russian Federation, and examines existing
as well as potential methods of cooperation between the two gov-
ernments in combating organized crime. Part II also analyzes
the problems that thwart increased cooperation. Finally, Part III
of this Comment argues that ratifying and putting into force a
21. See id. (noting that agreement was reached only after owners were kidnapped
to Fairview, Connecticut). This happened one month after Voloshin's father was killed
in Moscow. Id.
22. See Office of International Criminal Justice, supra note 2 (stating that it took
law enforcement agencies three years to collect evidence); see also Pyle, supra note 20, at
All (noting that case against Ivankov relied heavily on intercepted phone conversa-
tions between Ivankov and his associates).
23. Office of International Criminal Justice, supra note 2; see Pyle, supra note 20, at
All (reporting that in July 1996, Ivankov was convicted for his role in extortion plot);
see also Stephen Handelman, Russian Crime Boss Jailed for U.S. Extortion Scheme; Mobster
Claims He Was Framed by Soviets, FBI, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 30, 1997, at A17 (discussing
how before his sentencing in federal courtroom, Ivankov maintained that he was an-
ticommunist protester persecuted for his beliefs). Ivankov denied any criminal wrong-
doing, and claimed he was framed by the corrupt Russian government, former Soviet
intelligence services, and the FBI. Handelman, supra. Ivankov's lawyer even compared
him to well-known anti-Soviet dissidents. Id. U.S. Federal Judge Carol Amon sentenced
Ivankov to 115 months in prison, and his lawyer claimed he was going to serve only six
years and eight months because of time already served. Id.
24. Agreement Between the United States and Russia on Cooperation in Criminal
Law Matters, with Annex,June 30,1995, No. KAV 4518, State Dep't No. 96-38 [hereinaf-
ter MLAA].
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mutual legal assistance treaty25 ("MLAT") between Russia and
the United States will significantly affect the spread of Russian
organized crime in the Russian Federation, the United States,
and globally.
I. RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME, DOMESTIC STATUTORY
RESPONSES, AND MUTUAL LEGAL
ASSISTANCE TREATIES
Practitioners note that with the introduction of democracy
and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has seen a colossal
growth of organized crime 6.2  The Russian government has un-
dertaken numerous measures in combating organized crime,
but has been unable to eradicate the problem. 27 Experts argue
that MLATs, which require direct cooperation between law en-
forcement officials of two nations, are one bilateral mechanism
that is available in combating transnational criminal activities.
21
A. Development of Russian Organized Crime and Its Domestic and
Transnational Effects
Scholars believe that Russian organized crime has had dev-
astating effects on the well being and morale of the Russian peo-
ple, who consistently express the view that organized crime is
one of the biggest problems facing the nation.2 9 Practitioners
25. See I. Knapp, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties as a Way to Pierce Bank Secrecy, 20
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 405, 405 (1988) (defining mutual legal assistance treaty (or
"MLAT") as treaty that creates binding obligation on parties to provide assistance in
criminal investigations and proceedings). MLATs usually require direct exchange of
information between the U.S. Department of Justice and its foreign counterpart. Id.
Such exchange usually occurs without diplomatic requests and judicial involvement. Id.
at 406.
26. See Peter Daniel DiPaola, The Criminal Time Bomb: An Examination of the Effect of
the Russian Mafiya on the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, 4 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 145, 148 (1996) (describing how criminal world and government
officials took advantage of free market reforms); see also Tanya Frisby, The Rise of Organ-
ized Crime in Russia: Its Roots and Social Significance, 50 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 27, 30
(1998) (noting that changing social conditions contributed to growth of criminality).
27. See Frisby, supra note 26, at 39-41 (noting apparent weakness of law enforce-
ment institutions).
28. See Knapp, supra note 25, at 406-07 (stating that obtaining documentary evi-
dence is most desired form of assistance).
29. See RICHARD LAYARD &JOHN PARKER, THE COMING RUSSIAN BooM: A GUIDE To
NEW MARKETS AND POLITICS 149-51 (Free Press, 1996) (quoting President Boris Yeltsin
as saying that "[o]rganized crime has become a direct threat to Russia's strategic inter-
ests and national security").
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note that organized crime has infiltrated the Russian govern-
ment and is playing a significant role in Russia's political life."
In addition, its sophistication and advancement on the interna-
tional arena have given a cause for concern to many national
governments around the world."'
1. Gangsterism and Its Effect on Russian Society
Experts note that organized crime has existed in the Soviet
Union and Russia for decades, but it was only after the demise of
the Soviet Union and the introduction of open economic mar-
ket relations that it acquired threatening proportions.3 2 Today's
Russia has uncharacteristically high levels of crime compared to
both Western nations and former communist countries of East-
ern Europe. 3 Moreover, academics have blamed organized
crime for very poor economic conditions existing in the Russian
Federation. 4
a. Emergence of Russian Organized Crime
Today's Communist politicians in Russia try to present the
former Soviet Union as a crime-free society, but scholars note
that this portrayal is very far from the truth.3 5 Experts note that
organized crime has existed in Russia since the time of the
30. See Mike Cormaney, RICO in Russia: Effective Control of Organized Crime or An-
other Empty Promise?, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261, 269-70 (1997) (noting
how Russian organized crime developed contacts with government officials in order to
protect its operations and obtain larger profits).
31. See DiPaola, supra note 26, at 179-80 (noting that such concern stems from
states' basic need for security). Russia needs the assistance of other countries to fight its
organized crime. Id. at 181.
32. See Scott P. Boylan, Organized Crime and Corruption in Russia: Implications for U.S.
and International Law, 19 FoRDHAsM INT'L L.J. 1999, 2004-05 (1996) (describing how,
following collapse of Soviet Union, criminals took advantage of lack of commercial reg-
ulation); see also GLOBAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROJECT, RussLN ORGANIZED CRIME 17
(1997) (noting that Russia's economic, political, and social conditions gave rise to or-
ganized crime).
33. See LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 29, at 150-51 (comparing crime rates in Russia
with those of other countries). Russians face the problem of, on the one hand, domes-
tic and street crime, and, on the other hand, organized crime. Id. at 151.
34. See id. at 155 (stating that crime damages Russian economy by hurting small
businesses and government's revenues).
35. See DiPaola, supra note 26, at 147-48 (noting that Vadim Bakatin, last chairman
of Soviet KGB, admitted that "[a]fter 1917, [the Soviet] crime rate grew just like every-
where else in the world.").
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czars. 36 Organized criminal activity in the Soviet Union started
in the early 1920s, when burglary and robbery were the only
means of survival for hungry and homeless people. 7 In the
1960s, the illegal market for disappearing goods and services
grew, such that criminals, with the help of corrupt factory man-
agers and civil servants, shifted their concentration to distribu-
tion of hard-to-obtain goods and services.3" Finally in the 1970s
and 1980s, the growth of personal incomes, further development
of the illegal market, and increasing corruption led organized
crime members to extort and blackmail corrupt businessmen, 9
who, quite understandably, rarely complained to the authorities
for fear of losing their livelihood.4"
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the de-
velopment of quasi-capitalist relations in Russia in the late 1980s
and 1990s, scholars note that the activities of organized crime
members intensified and diversified.4' At the same time, one
commentator notes that the line separating the world of organ-
ized crime and that of the Russian government became difficult
to distinguish.42 Scholars believe that the newly created and
poorly regulated Russian market created immediately profitable
opportunities for criminal organizations and syndicates-com-
posed primarily of former government officials, secret Soviet
marketers, and common criminals-that immediately took ad-
vantage of the situation.4"
36. See id. at 148 (stating that groups of highwaymen, thieves, and smugglers ex-
isted in Russian since 17th century). Later, these criminal groups developed rules and
codes of honor. Id.
37. See Frisby, supra note 26, at 32 (stating that after internal power struggle follow-
ing Boleshevik Revolution, anti-criminal measures led to arrests of members and lead-
ers of criminal groups).
38. See DiPaola, supra note 26, at 148 (stating that in 1960s criminals began close
cooperation with government officials). Criminals within particular regions started
forming large criminal enterprises. Id.
39. See Frisby, supra note 26, at 33-34 (stating that by 1970s and 1980s some mem-
bers of criminal syndicates planned to assert political power).
40. See id. at 43 n.21 (explaining that criminals were inclined to rob people who
were afraid to complain to authorities).
41. See generally DiPaola, supra note 26, at 148-49 (quoting Professor Louise Shelley
as saying that new criminal coalition embodies "the political and economic power of a
criminal class more sophisticated than anything Russia has ever experienced before").
42. See id. at 148 (stating that both criminals and government officials profited
enormously through illegal market and corruption).
43. See Boylan, supra note 32, at 2005 (stating that illegal market is key to under-
standing Russia's current problems).
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b. Societal Impact: Crime by the Numbers
In February 1993, less than two years after the breakup of
the Soviet Union, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that
crime had become the major problem for the Russian Federa-
tion, and that its scope posed a great danger to the Russian
state.4 4 Yeltsin noted that criminal activity was injuring the coun-
try's economy, asserting a negative effect on Russia's political
life, and undermining public morale.45 Today's Russia has a de-
veloping economy, and scholars note that such states usually
have uncharacteristically high levels of crime.4 6
In 1994, murders accounted for over 32,000 deaths in Rus-
sia-doubling the number of murders in 1991, the last year of
the Soviet Union's existence.47 This figure translates into 21.8
murders per 100,000 people, which is significantly higher than
any developed or former communist country.48 There were
more people murdered in Russia in 1993 than during the almost
decade long war in Afghanistan.49 Practitioners state, however,
that it is not street crime that poses the greatest threat to the
people's existence; it is organized crime.50
According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs' 1998
estimate, there are 9000 criminal organizations operating in Rus-
sia.5 A poll conducted in the Russian Far East region in the
44. See LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 29, at 149 (noting that some people believe
that criminals are now in charge of Russian state).
45. Id.
46. Gennady R. Lezhikov, Statistical Information on Crime and Its Use in Crime Control,
presented at the Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Officers in Cairo, Egypt, Apr. 29-May 8, 1995 (visited Sept. 10, 1999)
<http://www.acsp.uic.edu/oicj/pubs/cji/110413.htm> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal) (noting that crime poses real threat to realization of socioeco-
nomic reforms in Russia).
47. See LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 29, at 150 (noting, however, that crime levels
rose more slowly or even fell in 1994-95). The number of murders in 1992 and 1993
was 23,000 and 29,000 respectively. Id.
48. Id. For instance, the U.S. murder rate in 1992 was 9.3 per 100,000 people,
Germany and France had murder rates of approximately 4 per 100,000 people, and the
figure for Japan was less than 1 per 100,000. Id.
49. See DiPaola, supra note 26, at 146 (giving numerical data for gang and street
crime in Russia).
50. See LAVARD & PARKER, supra note 29, at 151 (noting that when Russians com-
plain about crime in Russia and call their country "mafia state," they refer to organized
crime).
51. See Gary T. Dempsey, Mafia Capitalism or Red Legacy?, Cato Institute (visited
Aug. 15, 1999) <http://www.cato.org/dailys/1-07-98.html> (on file with the Fordham
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summer of 1992 showed that one-third of all residents believed
that criminals controlled the course of events in their region. 52
A similar poll taken in 1993 in the city of Yekaterinburg indi-
cated that seventy-five percent of the residents believed their city
was governed by organized crime.53 Experts opine that Russian
organized crime has invaded every single aspect of Russian life,
and its activities include takeover of political power, extortion,
theft, violent crime, contract killing, prostitution, gambling,
money laundering, and control of the economy.54
c. Effect on the Russian Economy
Practitioners note that Russian organized crime has also
had a devastating effect on the Russian economy, menacing le-
gitimate businesses throughout the country.55 Based on a 1997
study, conducted by a U.S. law professor and published in World
Bank's newsletter Transition,5a Russian organized crime deprives
the country of its tax base, discourages foreign investment, has a
negative effect on the banking sector and financial markets, and
intensifies the already existing problem of corruption.5 ' This
same study estimated that nearly half of the Russian economy is
International Law Journal) (noting that four out of five Russian businesses must pay pro-
tection money to criminals). The Cato Institute is a public policy research foundation
that undertakes an extensive publications program dealing with various policy issues.
Id.
52. See LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 29, at 153 (stating that another Russian public
opinion poll indicated that 49% of Russians rated crime as higher concern than unem-
ployment).
53. See id. at 153-54 (discussing possibility that fear of crime leads to stronger pub-
lic support for aggressively nationalistic, anti-reform politicians).
54. See Peter J. Vassalo, The New Ivan the Terrible: Problems in International Criminal
Enforcement and the Specter of the Russian Mafia, 28 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 173, 174
(1996) (comparing Russian organized crime to Sicilian Mafia); see also Johanna Mc-
Geary, Russia's Ruble Shakedown, TIME, Sept. 27, 1999, at 57 (defining money laundering
as "converting ill-gotten funds into money that looks legitimate"). The purpose of laun-
dering money is "to make a crime look like a normal transaction." McGeary, supra.
55. See generally Jonathan Lynn, Organized Crime Controls Nearly Half of Russia's Econ-
omy, U.S. Study Says, SEATTLE POST-INTEL., Mar. 20, 1997, at A4 (stating that billions of
U.S. dollars leave Russia as result of organized criminal activities).
56. The World Bank Group (visited Sept. 21, 1999) <http://www.worldbank.org/
html/prddr/trans/WEB/trans.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal). The Transition Newsletter reports on the latest economic, social, and business
developments in transition countries of Europe and Asia. Id. This newsletter is also
published in Russian. Id.
57. See Louise I. Shelley, The Price Tag of Russia's Organized Crime, TRANSITION, THE
WORLD BANK GROUP, Feb. 1997 (visited on Sept. 11, 1999) <http://www.worldbank.
org/html/prddr/trans/anfeb97/art4.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law
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controlled by organized crime, and that billions of U.S. dollars
are funneled out of the country as a result.5 8 Another study,
conducted by the Global Organized Crime Project, 9 estimated
that Russian organized crime controls forty percent of private
business, sixty percent of state-owned enterprises, and more than
half of the country's 1740 banks.6" In 1997, the Central Bank of
Russia announced that three commercial banks transferred a to-
tal of US$500 million, which originated from federal budget
funds, into high-yield securities markets. 61 The banks then pro-
ceeded to claim market losses, its finances disappeared, and the
government was unable to recover its money.62
Commentators argue that it is extremely difficult to open
up a business in Russia without being negatively affected by or-
ganized criminal groups.6 In 1993, the report by Pyotr Filipov,
the head of the analytical center in Moscow, indicated that
three-quarters of all Russian private businesses kept between ten
and twenty percent of their incomes as bribe money for criminal
enterprises.64 Businessmen must hire bodyguards to protect
Journal) (noting that Russian problem of organized crime cannot be addressed solely at
national level).
58. See id. (stating that organized crime is responsible for US$800 million in
monthly capital flight). Organized crime negatively affects tax collection. Id. Accord-
ing to the Russian customs service, duties are paid on only 35 out of every 1000 cars
imported into Russia. Id.
59. See The Global Organized Crime Project (visited July 15, 1999) <http://www.
Csis.org/goc/> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). The Global Organ-
ized Crime Project ("GOCP") is one of the initiatives at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, a public policy research institution dedicated to analysis and pol-
icy impact. Id. The object of GOCP is to assess the breadth, depth, and impact of
transnational threats, including international crime, terrorism, information warfare,
and weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Id. GOCP recommends concrete pol-
icy solutions, aimed at the U.S. government and businesses to prepare and respond
better to international problems. Id.
60. See International Organized Crime and Global Terrorism: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on International Relations, 105th Cong. 81-82 (1997) (testimony of Arnaud de
Borchgrave, Director, Global Organized Crime Project) (stating that 200 of Russia's
largest criminal organizations are "global conglomerates").
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See generally LAARD & PARXER, supra note 29, at 155 (noting that whereas big-
ger companies can afford to pay ransom to criminal groups, smaller businesses cannot).
Sometimes businesses must keep a low profile and refrain from advertising their serv-
ices to escape criminals' attention. Id.
64. See id. (noting that purpose of this study, ordered by President Yeltsin, was to
find out how crime affected Russian economy).
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themselves against racketeers.65 Moreover, practitioners note
that businessman cannot trust the Russian courts and their pro-
cedure for solving commercial disputes, and, therefore, often
voluntarily hire criminals to collect loans owed to them by coun-
terparts.66 The Russian Ministry of the Interior's 1993 report
claimed that organized crime controlled as much as forty per-
cent of the Russian Gross Domestic Product.
6 7
2. Russian Organized Crime in the International Arena
Commentators have blamed Russian organized crime for il-
legal capital outflows from Russia.6' Russian organized criminal
groups are now setting up criminal enterprises in the United
States and engage in a variety of criminal activities there.69 One
expert is also worried about Russian organized crime's advance-
ment into South America and the Caribbean, and possible alli-
ances with local organized criminal groups. 7' Finally, law en-
forcement officials are concerned about Russian criminals' in-
tentions and abilities to receive access to nuclear weapons and
materials, which would lead to security concerns of global pro-
portions.71
65. Id.
66. See id. (quoting director of Round Table of Russian Businesses as saying that
"It] here are no precise or detailed legal procedures for resolving economic conflicts. A
banker cannot be sure that his loan will be repaid, a businessman cannot be sure that
he will be paid for his goods."). As many smaller companies cannot afford protection,
they go out of business or are reluctant to seek out new business opportunities. Id.
67. Id.; see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 30 (Dryden Pr., 6th ed. 1994) (defining gross domestic product as measure of
size of country's economy). Gross domestic product is, roughly, the money value of all
the goods and services produced in a given year. Id.
68. Cormaney, supra note 30, at 265-66.
69. See Shoshanah V. Asnis, Controlling the Russian Mafia: Russian Legal Confusion
and U.S. Jurisdictional Power-Play, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 299, 307 (1996) (briefly outlining
history of Russian organized crime in United States).
70. See Farah, supra note 12, at Al (quoting U.S. drug-control policy director as
saying that "the Russians, along with the Nigerians, are the most threatening criminal
organizations based in the United States."). U.S. law enforcement officials are worried
about increasing contacts between Russian and Colombian organized criminal groups.
Id.
71. Wendy L. Mirsky, The Link Between Russian Organized Crime and Nuclear-Weapons
Proliferation: Fighting Crime and Ensuring International Security, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L.
749, 752 (1995).
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a. Criminal Activities and Capital Outflows
One commentator states, however, that Russia is only a
small part of Russian organized crime's activities.7 2 The same
expert has opined that Russian criminals have established their
enterprises throughout Europe and in the United States, and
their activities include drug trafficking, money laundering, pros-
titution, and trafficking of nuclear weapon materials.7' The
head of the National Central Bureau of Interpol in Moscow
claimed in 1997 that Russian organized crime illegally transfers
US$12 billion to international locations every year, usually by set-
ting up fictitious companies in Cyprus, Greece, Spain, and other
locales.7 ' A practitioner believes that Russian organized crime
exported over US$100 billion of capital from Russia during the
first three years of market reforms, and a typical outflow of capi-
tal is equal to US$2 billion per month.75
According to experts, money laundering is a major part of
Russian organized criminal activity.76 Organized crime has de-
posited close to US$40 billion in Swiss banks, and law enforce-
ment officials suspect that the money is being used to purchase
Swiss businesses, such as restaurants and retail stores.77 Russian
police sources believe that close to US$7 billion in proceeds
from organized crime were exported from the Soviet Union and
72. See Vassalo, supra note 54, at 174 (stating that Russian organized crime "is a
union of racketeers without equal").
73. See id. (citing one commentator as stating that Russian organized crime "is
engaged in extortion, theft, forgery, armed assault, contract killing, swindling, drug
running, arms smuggling, prostitution, gambling, loan sharking, embezzling, money
laundering, and illegal marketing-all on a monumental and increasingly international
scale.").
74. See Richard Thomas, et al., The Guardian Features Page, GUARDIAN (London),
Jan. 4, 1997, at I (stating that FBI and Russian police uncovered illegal export of
US$140 million worth of diamonds by former Russian minister).
75. See Cormaney, supra note 30, at 265-66 (noting that Russian organized criminal
groups continue to expand at international level); see also Andrew Higgins, Russia's Pros-
ecutor General Launches Criminal Case Against Moscow Bank, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1999, at
A4 (noting that Viktor Gerashchenko, head of Russia's Central Bank, estimated that
US$1 billion leaves Russia illegally each month).
76. See The Professional Newswire, A Roundup of Money Laundering News, 8 No. 7
MONEY LAUNDERING L. RP. 8 (Feb. 1998) (stating that Russia and Uzbekistan approved
draft agreement of cooperation against illegal financial transactions). According to the
press release, the agreement, signed on January 23, 1998, "provides for an exchange of
relevant information and cooperation in . . . activities aimed at exposing illegal finan-
cial operations and assisting in returning property." Id.
77. See id. (citing Swiss prosecutor stating that money laundering activities may
become security threats to Switzerland).
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Russia to Germany between 1988 and 1992.78 There is a report
indicating that Russian firms use the closely-located Baltic states
to launder their profits from illegal activities.79
Russian organized crime now uses Pacific region countries
to launder its illegal financial gains.80 Experts believe that Rus-
sian criminal organizations use U.S. middlemen to open ac-
counts and charter banks in the Pacific region in order to hide
the illegal Russian origin of the finances."' In 1999, British law
enforcement agencies began investigations into the money-laun-
dering activities of Russian organized crime in their country, 2
and French authorities also opened an inquiry into the import
of illegal Russian finances into France. 3 Recently, one Russian
businessman, Semion Mogilevitch, whom experts believe to be
one of the most important figures of Russian organized crime,
used Canadian stock exchanges for his money-laundering activi-
ties.84 Law enforcement officials believe that the company in-
78. See Recent Developments in Transnational Crime Affecting U.S. Law Enforcement and
Foreign Policy; Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in Criminal Matters with Panama, Treaty Doc.
102-15; and 1994 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Hearing Before the Senate
Subcomm. On Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, Comm. on Foreign Relations,
103rd Cong. 154 (1994) (statement of Rensselaer Lee, President, Global Advisory Ser-
vice) (arguing that illegal capital outflows help to develop Russian criminal enterprises
abroad).
79. See Baltics Used for Money-Laundering, Russian TV Claims, BALTIC NEWS SERV.,
Oct. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20195496 (stating that companies used Baltic states to
transfer money to off-shore companies).
80. See Russian Mafia Using Pacific Region as Money Laundering Base: OECD, AGENCE
FRANcE-PREssE, Feb. 11, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2544874 (quoting expert as saying
that "[a] heavy concentration of financial activity related to Russian organised crime
has been observed, specifically in Western Samoa, Nauru, Vanuatu and the Cook Is-
lands.").
81. See id. (stating that local authorities are suspicious of increasing Russian activity
in Pacific region).
82. See Raymond Bonner, Russian Organized Crime Penetrates U.S. Markets, Mob King-
pins Posing as Venture Capitalists, NEW ORE. TiMES, July 25, 1999, at A19 (stating that
British intelligence and law enforcement agencies concentrated on one Russian busi-
nessman with personal wealth of US$100 million).
83. See French Investigating Alleged Russian Money Laundering, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Sept. 9, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25102873 (noting that French investigation is part of
inquiry into alleged misuse of International Monetary Fund's loans to Russian Federa-
tion).
84. See Paul Waldie, Mob Boss Picked Canadian Exchanges for YBM Scam; Court Told
Russian Selected Canada for Alleged Money-Laundering Plan Because He Thought Markets Had
Lax Rules, GLOBE & MAIL, June 8, 1999, at BI (stating information concerning use of
Canadian stock exchanges as laundering medium emerged in U.S. District Court in
Philadelphia as part of plea agreement involving Semion Mogilevitch's criminal enter-
prise).
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volved in this scam, YBM Magnex International Inc., was the
cover for Mr. Mogilevitch's illegal activities.85 Russian money
laundering operations have likewise been uncovered in Swe-
den86 and Spain.8
7
In 1998, authorities in Switzerland adjudged one Russian
businessman on charges of money laundering and membership
in a criminal organization, as well as violations of Swiss property
laws.88 Because Swiss officials could not obtain sufficient evi-
dence, a Geneva court dismissed charges of involvement in a
criminal organization, leaving only the lesser charge of failing to
observe Swiss rules limiting foreigners' right to purchase land.89
Swiss law enforcement authorities suspect that more than 150
people and ninety Swiss firms are tied to Russian organized
crime.9" From July to September 1999, the Swiss government
froze fifty-nine bank accounts and ordered banks to provide in-
formation about certain Russian citizens, including former and
current members of the Russian government, having accounts in
Switzerland.91 In September 1999, the Italian newspaper Corriere
Della Sera published a list of twenty-four Russian citizens who face
85. See id. (alleging that Mogilevitch owned at least 50% of YBM Magnex Interna-
tional Inc.). Ernst & Young, YBM Magnex International Inc.'s receiver, pleaded guilty
on behalf of the company for fraud, and agreed to a US$3 million fine. Id.
86. See Swedish Police Uncover Large Russian Money-Laundering Scam, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, July 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2158034 (stating that Swedish police uncov-
ered money laundering operation involving US$6.8 million stolen from Russian Federa-
tion).
87. See Russians Arrested, Accused of Money-Laundering; Unattributed Report: "12 Rus-
sian Mafia Members Held for Money-Laundering", WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, July 25, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 21974252 (noting that suspects illegally exported over US$50 mil-
lion from Russia). The National Police's Drugs and Organized Crime Squad in
Marbella and Malaga arrested a group that included seven Russians, three Belorussians,
and a Lithuanian. Id.
88. See Naomi Koppel, Swiss To Try Russian Mafia Suspect, ASSOCIATED PREss, Nov.
28, 1998, available in 1998 WL 23034085 (stating that after breakup of former Soviet
Union, Switzerland became money laundering locale for Russian criminal figures).
The Russian businessman, Sergei Mikhailov, was arrested in Switzerland in 1996. Id.
89. See Legal Route Way To Beat Russia's Mob, Moscow TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at 10
(stating that all evidence presented against Mikhailov was circumstantial). Prosecutors
claimed Mikhailov belonged to the Solntsevo criminal organization, based in Moscow.
Id. A key witness was murdered during the trial and other witnesses were afforded
police protection. Id.
90. Gail Robinson, The Russian Mafia (Money Laundering in Switzerland), 46 WORLD
PREss REVIEW, No. 6, June 1, 1999, at 18.
91. See John Tagliabue, Dozens of Accounts Are Frozen as Prosecutors Search for Evidence
of Money Laundering by Kremlin Brass, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sept. 4, 1999, at A29 (not-
ing that investigation was launched upon request by Russia's Chief Prosecutor, Yuri
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charges of money laundering in Switzerland. 2 This list even in-
cludes two children, who are close to a Russian governmental
official.9"
b. Russian Organized Crime in the United States
Commentators note that Russian criminals have had a pres-
ence in the United States for a number of years.94 In the 1970s
and 1980s, a group of ethnic Russian criminals, with no ties to
their motherland, operated in New York, specializing in white-
collar crimes.9" One practitioner believes that the most signifi-
cant growth of Russian organized crime in the United States oc-
curred, however, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.96
As a result of the democratization in Russia and the liberaliza-
tion of Russian emigration policies, a new wave of violent,
poorly-educated criminals entered the United States.9 7 In a rela-
tively short time, this new wave of criminals not only took over
the white-collar criminal industry in the United States, which was
the specialty of the older Russian criminal groups, but also ex-
panded its activities to include racketeering, drug trafficking,
money laundering, extortion, and prostitution.
98
In a recent case involving the Bank of New York Co., the
sixteenth largest bank in the United States, federal authorities
are investigating whether high-ranked Russian officials used the
Skuratov). Those investigated included Pavel Borodin, head of Yeltsin's property man-
agement team and Oleg Soskovets, a former deputy prime minister of Russia. Id.
92. See Even Children Are Accused of Money Laundering in Russia, WHAT PAPERS SAY,
Sept. 6, 1999, at 11 (noting that Swiss investigator's letter to Swiss banks stated that they
"are supposed to inform [him] whether the persons listed below had any banking rela-
tions with [these banks]").
93. See id. (stating that parent of these children is close to Pavel Borodin). The list
includes Lyuba Lyulkina, who is eight years old, and her brother Ivan Lyulkin, who is
18. Id.
94. See Boylan, supra note 32, at 2012 (noting that activity of Russian organized
crime in United States spread significantly after collapse of Soviet Union).
95. See Asnis, supra note 69, at 307 (describing this wave of white-collar criminals as
"the second team").
96. See generally Daniel L. Lungren, Russian Organized Crime, Report of the Office of the
Attorney General of the State of California, Mar. 1996 (visited Aug. 17, 1999) <http://www.
alternatives.com/crime/RUSORG1.HTML> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) (describing numerous activities of Russian criminal groups in state of Califor-
nia).
97. See Asnis, supra note 69, at 307-08 (describing this new wave of violent
criminals as "the first team").
98. See id. at 308 (stating that biggest problem facing U.S. law enforcement is reluc-
tance of victims and witnesses to cooperate with authorities).
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bank to launder billions of dollars linked to Russian organized
crime. 99 One expert notes that Russian organized crime and
government officials may have laundered up to US$15 billion
through the Bank of New York,' °° while the bank itself received
US$240 million in monthly fees.'0 ' Authorities suspect that the
laundered money may be part of economic aid provided to Rus-
sia by the International Monetary Fund. 0 2 The Bank of New
York suspended Lucy Edwards, a London-based vice president of
the bank and Natasha Kagalovsky, the bank's vice president in
charge of the Eastern Europe Division, over the probe. 0 3 Au-
thorities believe that this affair may be one of the largest money
laundering operations ever uncovered in the United States.
10 4
Narcotics are today a large source of income for Russian or-
99. See Paul Beckett et al., Rival Alerted FBI to Activity at Bank of New York, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 20, 1999, at A4 (stating that Republic National Bank of New York alerted Bank
of New York Co. of money laundering activities).
100. See Jesse Angelo, Outwardly Calm, European Money Houses Run Scared, N.Y.
POST, Aug. 31, 1999, at 14 (noting that concerned European banks search their ac-
counts for evidence of money laundering).
101. See Al Guart, Bank Made Killing on Mob: $720M in Profits from Russian Crime
Dough, N.Y. POST, Aug. 21, 1999, at 9 (noting that Bank of New York Co. charged one
Russian bank US$56 per money wire transfer, as much as six times above standard rate).
102. See Paul Beckett & David S. Cloud, Russian Mob Role is Probed in IMF Losses,
WALL ST.J., Aug. 25, 1999, at A3 (stating that law enforcement authorities have investi-
gated account activity in other U.S. banks).
103. See Jesse Angelo & Al Guart, Bank of NY. Probers Eye Yeltsin Ties, N.Y. POST,
Aug. 27, 1999, at 7 (citing Russian top prosecutor announcing he was going to start
inquiry into money laundering operation); see also Michael Allen, Prosecution Faces Hur-
dles in Bank Case, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 1999, at A3 (noting that Lucy Edwards was later
fired for, among other things, "gross misconduct" violations); Jesse Angelo, Veep Fired in
Bank of N. Y. Probe Is Suing, N.Y. POST, Sept. 30, 1999, at 24 (noting that Lucy Edwards is
suing Bank of New York for unfair dismissal and failure to follow proper procedure);
Andrew Higgins, Moscow Begins To Investigate Money Trail, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1999, at
A2 (stating that Russian domestic intelligence agency began its own investigation); Ann
Davis, First Indictments Are Handed up in Money-Laundering Inquiry, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6,
1999, at A4 (noting that federal jury indicted Lucy Edwards, her husband, Peter Berlin,
and Russian businessman Aleksey Volkov on charges of conspiracy to illegally transmit
US$7 billion). U.S. prosecutors have not sought indictments on charges of money laun-
dering, which are more difficult to prove. Davis, supra.
104. Jack Kelley & Tom Lowry, Russian Prosecutor, IMFJoin Mob Probe FBI Tracks
$10B Paper Trail Through Bank of New York, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 1999, at Bi. See also
John Tagliabue, Italy Sees Russian Mob Link Through Bank of New York, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 1999, at Al (noting that part of money allegedly laundered through Bank of New
York resulted from Russian organized criminal activities in Italy). Members of Russian
organized crime raised money in Italy through racketerring, extortion, and tax fraud.
Tagliabue, supra.
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ganized crime.15 Many Russian criminals, in cooperation with
other international crime groups, employ their transnational
connections in Moscow and Poland to traffic and sell drugs in
the United States.10 6 In the 1993 case of United States v. Podlog,107
two Russian drug dealers, along with members of the Italian Ma-
fia, were tried and convicted for collaborating to import drugs
into the United States.' °8 Law enforcement officials claimed
that Russian immigrants David Podlog and Alexander Moysif re-
ceived heroin delivered to the United States from Poland, and
later resold it to a Sicilian-American criminal organization. 10 9 In
February 1993, law enforcement authorities in Los Angeles inter-
cepted a ten pound shipment of opium that was delivered from
Russia, hidden in a set of matrioshka dolls. 110 Experts note that
a significant number of Russian immigrants were indicted in
New York for illegal import, distribution, and sale of drugs in the
early 1990's."' Today, Colombian drug cartels use Russia as a
route to ship cocaine from Latin America to Europe, and signifi-
cant quantities of drugs have already been confiscated by the
Russian authorities.1
2
Several members of Armenian organized criminal groups in
105. See Thomas, supra note 74, at 1 (stating that raw opium enters Russia from
Afghanistan, Krygistan, and Ukraine); see also Rushailo Outlines Measures To Combat Trans-
national Crime, ITAR TASS, June 4, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17671644 (stressing im-
portance of cooperation between countries comprising Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States).
106. See SaraJankiewicz, Glasnost and the Growth of Global Organized Crime, 18 Hous.
J. INT'L L. 215, 238 (1995) (noting that cooperation of Russian criminals in United
States with Italian Mafia proved beneficial and profitable for both crime groups).
107. United States v. Podlog, et al., No. S2 92 Cr. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd in part,
35 F.3d 699 (2d Cir. 1994). See Former Soviet Republics New Source of Heroin Entering West,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, April 1, 1993, available in 1993 WL 10705708 (stating that for-
mer communist countries have potential to flood western countries with narcotics).
According to Russian estimates, wild marijuana covers 1000 sq. miles of the former
Soviet Union. New Source of Heroin, supra.
108. See Asnis, supra note 69, at 308 (stating that crimes committed by Russian
criminal groups are comparable to those committed by Italian Mafia).
109. See New Source of Heroin, supra note 107 (citing U.S. law enforcement agent
stating that heroin is delivered from southeast or central Asia to Moscow and then
transported to Poland for distribution in Western countries).
110. Id.
111. SeeJAMEs 0. FINCKENAUER & ELINJ. WARING, RuSSIAN MAFIA IN AMERICA: IMMI-
GRATION, CULTURE, AND CRIME 157 (Northeast. U. Press 1998) (noting that one suspect
traveled from Thailand to Denmark with narcotics hidden in television picture tube).
U.S. authorities also indicted Russian immigrants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania for
production of crack vials. Id.
112. Thomas, supra note 74, at 1.
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California were tried and convicted in 1994 of extortion, kidnap-
ping, and attempted murder.1 3 Several years ago, a number of
professional Russian hockey players working in the United States
complained that Russian criminal enterprises extorted money
from them, and threatened that if their demands were not met,
the players' families' well-being in Russia would be in jeop-
ardy.'" 4 Pavel Bure, who then played for the Vancouver Canucks
of the National Hockey League, reportedly made payments to
members of Russian organized crime." 5 Russian criminals also
targeted Alexander Mogilny for extortion, but he was able to
avoid the threats with the help of the FBI." 6 Mobsters de-
manded protection money from another Russian hockey player
in the United States, Alexei Zhitnik, who, instead of going to the
authorities, went to a more powerful criminal group, which was
able to solve the problem."' Investigators report that close to
eighty percent of Russian hockey players in the United States
and Canada make regular payments to Russian organized
crime.11
8
One report notes that highly-educated Russian white-collar
criminals continue engaging in fraudulent activities."' In Los
Angeles, a physician and a graduate of Moscow's Missile Con-
struction Institute allowed patients to bill insurance companies
for non-existent injuries and claims, perpetrating a fraud that
cost insurance companies US$1 billion. 120 Russian organized
crime members also cause major economic harm to U.S. taxpay-
113. See Lungren, supra note 96 (stating that this group was responsible for ex-
torting money from members of Armenian community).
114. Boylan, supra note 32, at 2012.
115. See Kevin Sherrington, Russians Come to NHL Freely, but Mafia Is Never Far Be-
hind, DALLAs MoRI. NEws, May 4, 1997, at B1 (noting existence of videotape of Bure's
testimony about one man threatening to break his legs).
116. See GLOBAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROJECT, supra note 32, at 46 (stating that sports
in Russia is interconnected with organized crime).
117. See Gary T. Dempsey & Aaron Lukas, Is Russia Controlled by Organized Crime?,
USA TODAY, May 1, 1999, at 32 (quoting Alexei Zhitnik as stating "[t]he cops can't do
anything. No rules. No laws."). Many Russian citizens share Zhitnik's views. Id.
118. See Fred Girard, Fetisov Denies Links to Mob, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 9, 1998, at D1
(noting that president of Russian hockey federation was murdered in Russia in 1997).
119. See Sebastian Smith, Savvy, Ruthless Russian Mafia Moves into U.S., AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 10, 1994, available in 1994 WL 9599858 (quoting FBI spokesman as
stating that "[w] e consider them a problem .... Most of the Russian-type crime groups
have been involved in very significant white-collar crime activity.").
120. Id.
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ers by engaging in fuel tax fraud.1 21 Taking advantage of a law
that permits distribution companies to defer paying excise taxes
until gasoline is actually transferred to a retailer, Russian white-
collar criminals were able to sell gasoline to independent retail-
ers with the invoices claiming that all taxes had been paid. 122
When government officials came to collect the unpaid federal
excise taxes, they discovered that the distribution company ex-
isted only on paper. 123 In August 1995, the U.S. government in-
dicted twenty-five people, including fifteen Russian immigrants,
on charges connected to a fuel tax evasion scheme. 124 U.S. law
enforcement authorities believe that this operation, which in-
volves the evasion of US$140 million in state and federal fuel
taxes, is the largest motor-fuel tax evasion case in U.S. history.125
This case produced seventeen guilty pleas,126 and a federal jury
in the U.S. District Court in Camden, New Jersey, on June 19,
1998, convicted four defendants of participating in this illegal
operation. 12
7
Practitioners indicate that Russian criminal activities also in-
clude production and sale of counterfeit credit cards.' 21 After
121. See FINCKENAUER & WARING, supra note 111, at 244 (indicating that fuel fraud
cases, in addition to economic damage, also create physical and psychological harm
caused by extortion and intimidation).
122. See id. at 150-51 (noting that four or five traditional organized crime families
in New York participated in this fraudulent activity). Such operations are also known as
daisy-chain schemes. Id. at 150.
123. See id. at 152 (noting that Russian immigrants were involved in many schemes
in various jurisdictions, including California, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania).
124. See id. at 244 (citing U.S. officials stating that this case demonstrated how
Russian crime was developing in United States).
125. See Four Convicted in Largest Motor Fuel Tax Fraud in U.S. History, U.S. DEP'T OF
TitANsp., June 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 356011 (stating that this case involved tax-
evasion scheme operating in Delaware, Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania).
126. See id. (noting that this case was brought by U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion's Office of Inspector General, Internal Revenue Service, FBI, and U.S. Department
of Justice).
127. See id. (noting that jury acquitted two defendants, John Ruocco of NewJersey
and Michael Lipkin of New York City). The jury convicted Daniel Enright on charges
of conspiracy, wire fraud, money laundering, tax evasion, and a currency reporting vio-
lation; Demetrios Karamanos on charges of conspiracy, wire fraud, money laundering,
and tax evasion; Richard Pedroni on a conspiracy charge; and Mary Ingram on charges
of conspiracy, wire fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion. Id.
128. FINCKENAUER & WARING, supra note 111, at 156; see Abraham Abramovsky,
Prosecuting the "Russian Mafia": Recent Russian Legislation and Increased Bilateral Coopera-
tion May Provide the Means, 37 VA. J. INr'L L. 191, 198-99 (1996) (noting that some
counterfeit credit cards were sold to Russian immigrants in Brighton Beach, New York).
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obtaining information about active accounts, criminals then en-
code the required information into counterfeit credit cards. 129
The card is later used to purchase merchandise from outside
vendors, some of whom are also part of the criminal conspir-
acy. 130 In one case, law enforcement authorities arrested two
Russian immigrants who attempted to use a counterfeit credit
card to purchase a US$12,000 photocopier. 131
c. Advancements into South America and the Caribbean
U.S., European, and South American police officials report
that Russian criminal groups are advancing into South America
and the Caribbean. 1 2 Members of Russian organized crime, at-
tracted by the protective bank secrecy laws of Caribbean nations
such as Antigua and Aruba, have opened banks in Caribbean
countries and use them to launder money that originates from
countries with stricter banking laws. 133 According to law en-
forcement sources, the Caribbean is also attractive to Russian or-
ganized crime because there is a growing market for drugs in
Eastern Europe.
134
In September 1997, one newspaper reported that members
of Russian organized crime were establishing an alliance with
129. See Abramovsky, supra note 128, at 198 (noting that one such group
purchased large amount of goods over three-year period in different U.S. states).
130. See id. (noting that one group of Russian criminals used such scam in 1994 to
earn over US$500,000 per month). Some of the counterfeit credit cards and currency
were used outside of the United States. Id.
131. See FINCKENAUER & WARING, supra note 111, at 156 (noting that some counter-
feit cards were carelessly made, with such obvious errors as misspellings in names of
banks).
132. See Farah, supra note 12, at Al (noting that growing number of alliances be-
tween Russian and Colombian organized criminal groups is most dangerous trend in
global drug smuggling).
133. See id. (noting that many offshore banks around Caribbean are linked with
banks in Russia that are controlled by organized crime). A U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration special agent in charge of the Caribbean claimed, "[w]e have identified
a number of Russian organizations in the Caribbean and see a dramatic increase in
their investments in hotels and gambling .... They are very tight organizations, very
difficult to penetrate, and they present us with language problems. Gathering intelli-
gence is a problem." Id.
134. See id. (citing U.S. and European intelligence sources stating that members
of Russian organized crime and representatives of Cali cocaine cartel have met on Car-
ibbean islands of Antigua, Aruba, and St. Vincent); see also Joshua H. Warmund, Com-
ment, Removing Drug Lords and Street Pushers: The Extradition of Nationals in Colombia and
the Dominican Republic, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2373, 2394-95 (1999) (describing Domin-
ican Republic's role as gateway for Colombian drug shipments).
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Colombian drug cartels, aimed at sending weapons to South
America in exchange for narcotics heading to Europe. t35 U.S.
and European intelligence officials are believed to have evidence
of several Russian ships entering the northern Colombian port
of Turbo in 1997 and unloading shipments of military equip-
ment in exchange for drugs.136 One expert's fear of Russian or-
ganized crime stems from the fact that it consists of many well-
educated, capable members all over the world, all with access to
sophisticated weapons and equipment.13 7
d. Providing Access to Nuclear Weapons
There is substantial evidence that members of Russian or-
ganized criminal groups are seeking access to nuclear materials
because of their potential for enormous profit. 8 Experts be-
lieve that Russian organized criminal groups are close to receiv-
ing access to the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal 13 9 and
that they will then try to resell or trade these nuclear materials
on the international illegal market. 4 ° Organized criminal
groups that gain access to nuclear weapons and materials create
clear security concerns to both Russia and the United States.'4 1
135. Farah, supra note 12, at Al. Law enforcement authorities believe that Russian
criminal groups attempted to sell Colombian drug traffickers a submarine, helicopters,
and surface-to-air missiles. Id.
136. See id. (noting that authorities believe Russian vessels imported shipments of
assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades).
137. See id. (quoting FBI deputy assistant director stating that "[w]hen [Russian
criminal organizations] overlap with other criminal groups, they tend to set up cooper-
ative efforts .... They learn from the other groups, and they work together. No one
else does that.").
138. See Mirsky, supra note 71, at 752 (analyzing potential nuclear threat that Rus-
sian organized crime presents to international security).
139. See Jankiewicz, supra note 106, at 240 (quoting German Minister of State as
saying that "Russian government officials as well as international networks are involved
in the leakage of the dangerous materials."). U.S. Defense and Energy Department is
trying to cooperate with the Russian authorities in controlling and protecting nuclear
materials, but the program has not had much success. Id. at 242.
140. See Mirsky, supra note 71, at 761-62 (noting that organized criminal groups
take advantage of poorly guarded borders).
141. See Challenges to U.S. Security in the 1990's: International Organized Crime and
Nuclear Security: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. On International Security, International
Organizations and Human Rights, Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103rd Cong. 75-77 (1994)
(statement of R. James Woolsey, Director, Central Intelligence Agency) [hereinafter
Woolsey] (explaining that most cases of nuclear material smuggling have not involved
organized criminal groups). Most cases of nuclear smuggling involve individuals or
groups with no visible connections to organized criminal groups. Id. at 76. For exam-
ple, a military officer with access to nuclear weapons or an employee at a nuclear re-
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There are also possibilities that authoritarian states, such as Iran,
Libya, and North Korea may try to acquire nuclear weapons or
material from organized criminal groups in order to enhance
their weapons development programs. 14 2
There have already been cases of low-enriched uranium,
medical and other radioactive isotopes, and scam materials be-
ing offered for sale on the illegal market.14 3 In June 1994, Rus-
sian law enforcement authorities arrested three men for possess-
ing three kilograms of enriched uranium. 14 4 In May 1994, Ger-
man police searched the garage of a person suspected to be
involved in counterfeiting operations, expecting to find printing
equipment, and instead discovered plutonium. 4 5 An undis-
closed nation allegedly paid a suspect subsequently arrested in
this case US$100 million to purchase the weapons-grade pluto-
nium. 14  In August 1994, in what authorities believe to be the
biggest seizure of nuclear materials ever,147 the German police
seized 350 grams of plutonium stored in a suitcase on board a
Lufthansa airlines fight from Moscow to Munich. 148 Ironically,
search institute is in position to steal weapons-grade nuclear materials and pass them on
to interested groups. Id.
142. Id. James Woolsey stated that "[t]he inherent difficulties of dealing with an
essentially criminal target that affects our national security interests are compounded in
Russia, a country that is still undergoing a radical transformation as it comes to grips
with the staggering problems left in the wake of over 70 years of communism." Id. at
77; see also Peter, supra note 19 (noting that in November 1997, Iranian national was
arrested in Moscow for trying to obtain secret documents from missile specialist).
143. See Woolsey, supra note 141, at 76-77 (indicating that Russian organized crimi-
nal groups are possibly involved in these activities). While low grade nuclear materials
and radioactive isotopes cannot be used to make nuclear weapons, terrorists can use
them as supplements to conventional bombs to achieve low level radioactive contamina-
tion. Id. at 77.
144. See id. at 76 (stating also that janitor at unspecified Moscow facility stole ura-
nium from plant).
145. Thom Shanker, Munich Drama Just Hints at Wider Plutonium Intrigue in Ger-
many, CM. TFuB., Aug. 21, 1994, at 7.
146. Id.; see Bruce W. Nelan, Formula for Terror: The Former Soviet Arsenal Is Leaking
into the West, Igniting Fears of a New Brand of Nuclear Horror, TIME, Aug. 29, 1994, at 46
(noting that German police confiscated six grams of plutonium from garage of German
businessman arrested for counterfeiting).
147. See Nelan, supra note 146, at 46 (noting how Bavarian Interior Minister de-
scribed this confiscation as "the biggest-ever plutonium find in Germany, and probably
the world").
148. See id. (noting that confiscated plutonium, enriched to 87%, was usable for
making nuclear bombs); see also Plutonium Seizure Masterminded by German Intelligence:
Russia, AGENCE FRANcE-PIEsSE, Aug. 31, 1994, available in 1994 WL 9565781 (noting
that only few kilograms of plutonium are needed to make atomic bomb); Shanker,
1999] U.S. -RUSSIAN MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY 187
Russian Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy, Viktor Sidorenko,
was on that flight.149 German officials stated that Sidorenko was
not a suspect, but they made it clear that they had no doubts that
the seized plutonium arrived from Russia.'
Suspicious accidents have occurred at Russian nuclear stor-
age sites.151 In September 1998, at Russia's largest plutonium
storage site, a sergeant killed two guards and fled.'52 Access to
nuclear materials has been facilitated by the high numbers of
unemployed Russian nuclear scientists existing since the collapse
of the Soviet Union. 153 These individuals may provide the essen-
tial connection between organized criminal groups, which have
the resources to attract these scientists and the nuclear indus-
try. 154
supra note 145, at 7 (stating that seizure of plutonium was result of carefully planned
operation). German law enforcement authorities arrested Justiniano Torres, a native of
Colombia, and two of his accomplices. Shanker, supra.
149. See Nelan, supra note 146, at 46 (stating that Viktor Sidorenko's agency super-
vises stocks of fissionable materials in Russia).
150. See id. (stating that German Chancellor Helmut Kohl sent German intelli-
gence coordinator to Moscow to discuss problem of nuclear proliferation with Russian
officials); see also Shanker, supra note 145, at 7 (quoting Bavaria's chief prosecutor stat-
ing that "[tihe suspects never once during the entire negotiations asked about who
would be the end user. They knew it was for resale, though. They asked for no other
information. They were just desperate to make the sale."); Plutonium Seizure Mas-
terminded by German Intelligence, supra note 148 (quoting Russian official that plutonium
was "put on a Lufthansa plane by the German secret service to discredit Russia"). Rus-
sian officials denied that the seized plutonium originated in Russia, but Russian scien-
tists refused to rule out such possibility. Plutonium Seizure Masterminded by German Intelli-
gence, supra; but see Carey Goldberg, Russians Seize 22 Pounds of Uranium; Though It Was
Non-Weapons-Grade Material, the Seizure Reflects a Crackdown, AUSTIN AMER.-STATES., Aug.
25, 1994, at A7 (noting that Russian government promised to work harder to prevent
nuclear smuggling). Shortly after the Lufthansa incident, Russian security officers
seized 22 pounds of uranium, which was stolen from a nuclear research complex.
Goldberg, supra. The confiscated uranium, however, was not weapons-grade, and was
good only for industrial use. Id.
151. See Barbara Slavin, Nuclear Weapons Threat Lurks in Russia; Poorly Paid Guards
Are a Security Concern, USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 1998, at 20A (quoting expert on weapon
nonproliferation that "[tihe Russian economy today is the world's greatest proliferation
threat"). Russia currently possesses 1500 tons of nuclear fuel, enough to make 70,000
bombs. Id.
152. See id. (noting that authorities do not believe any plutonium was stolen).
153. See generally Mirsky, supra note 71, at 765 (describing "brain drain" problem in
Russian nuclear industry); see also Nelan, supra note 146, at 46 (noting that 100,000
workers employed in Russian nuclear plants receive low salaries or get no pay at all for
long periods of time).
154. See Mirsky, supra note 71, at 765-66 (stating that U.S. Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment studies Russian nuclear security and "brain drain" problem in
order to investigate problems of nuclear proliferation in Russia); see also Nelan, supra
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B. Russia's War on Organized Crime: Laws and Decrees
In 1993, President Yeltsin issued the Presidential Decree On
Urgent Measures Aimed at Protecting the Population from Banditry and
Other Manifestations of Organized Crime155 (or "Decree"), which
was designed to curb the spread of criminal activities.156 Two
years later, Russian legislators adopted the new Criminal Code of
the Russian Federation'57 (or "Criminal Code"), which has provi-
sions that specifically address the problem of organized criminal
groups and activities associated with them.' 58
1. Yeltsin's 1994 Decree
Practitioners note that, realizing the enormous problem
that organized crime poses to the Russian economic and social
well-being, the Russian government enacted numerous measures
to fight Russian organized crime.159 Authorities and public
opinion attributed organized crime in Russia to criminals from
Chechnya and other parts of the Caucasus. 6 ° In 1993, President
Yeltsin ordered all undocumented aliens to be deported from
the Russian capital.' 6 ' The police in Moscow detained 14,000
people who did not have a residence permit, and deported 5000
note 146, at 46 (indicating that in 1993 Russian police prevented 11 attempts to steal
uranium from nuclear installations).
155. Yeltsin's Decree "On Urgent Measures Aimed at Protecting the Population from Bandi-
try and Other Manifestations of Organized Crime ("Decree"),June 17, 1994, BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, available in LEXIS, News (Country and Region), BBCMIR File [hereinafter
Yeltsin's Decree].
156. Id.
157. Ugolovniy Kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii, No. 63-FZ ofJune 13, 1996, as amended on
June 25, 1998, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 25, Item 2954. For English translation of
the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, see CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FED-
ERATION (William E. Butler trans., Simmonds & Hill Pub. 2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter
CRIMINAL CODE].
158. Id. arts. 209, 210, 30, 32, 33, 35, 174.
159. See generally LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 29, at 169 (noting that, unable to
rely on courts, Russian politicians proposed draconian measures against criminal activi-
ties).
160. See Ken Fireman, Rough Send-Off from Moscow: Caucasus Residents Forced Home,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 17, 1993, at 10 (quoting police inspector as saying that "[t]hese people
who come from the Caucasus, well, what they do is just robbery .... [T]hey practically
dictate the prices at our markets.").
161. See Malcolm Gray, Crime and Punishment: Muscovites Applaud as the Police Get
Tough, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 25, 1993, at 30 (noting that illegal residents were forcibly put
onto trains heading to Caucasus). Moscow mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, called on city resi-
dents to inform on neighbors who lived there without a residency permit. Id.
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of them to provincial Russia or the Caucasus region.' 62 Then,
on June 14, 1994, Yeltsin issued the Presidential Decree On Ur-
gent Measures Aimed at Protecting the Population from Banditry and
Other Manifestations of Organized Crime, designed to address the
problem of organized crime. 65 Aimed at defending the life and
property interests of Russian citizens, 164 the Decree introduced a
165number of strict measures designed to curb criminal activities.
The Decree, among other powers, enabled the government to
engage in expert examinations of suspected persons prior to in-
stituting criminal proceedings, provided there is sufficient evi-
dence of such individual's involvement in an organized criminal
group and if the public procurator consents. 166 The results of
these examinations may later be used as evidence in criminal
cases.
1 67
Similarly, the government can inspect an individual's or his
162. See Helen Womack, Minorities Bear Brunt of Police Crime Clampdown, EUROPEAN
NEWS PAGE, Oct. 18, 1993, available in 1993 WL 10887984 (noting that anyone without
residency permit can only live in Moscow temporarily, after registering with police);
Moscow Cracks Down on Visitors from Former Soviet Republics, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 16, 1993,
at 12A (indicating that 10,000 people were deported from Moscow during two-week
state of emergency period); see also Gray, supra note 161, at 30 (noting that many depor-
tees were vendors who supplied fruits and vegetables on Moscow's markets, and depor-
tations caused prices to go up dramatically); Fireman, supra note 160, at 10 (noting that
police authorities claimed that this measure reduced crime by 16.5%).
163. Yeltsin's Decree, supra note 155.
164. See id. (indicating that Yeltsin introduced Decree "[f] or the purpose of pro-
tecting the life, health and property interests of citizens, ensuring the security of society
and the state, and in compliance with the federal programme of the Russian Federation
for stepping up the fight against crime.").
165. See id. (directing "that a system of urgent measures aimed at combating bandi-
try and other serious crimes committed by organized groups of criminals be brought
into force.").
166. Id. art. 1. This part of Article 1 states:
[W]here there is sufficient data on an individual's involvement in a gang or
other organized group of criminals suspected of serious crimes, upon agree-
ment with the procurator and prior to instituting criminal proceedings, expert
examinations may be carried out, the results of which may be regarded as
evidence in criminal cases of this category and preliminary checks may be au-
thorized into the financial and economic activity and the property and finan-
cial situation not only of the individual in question but of his relatives or other
persons who have resided with him during the past five years, as well as of
physical and legal persons and public associations whose property, funds or
name may have been controlled or used by the suspect.
Id.
167. See id. ("[i]n order to prepare and carry out investigative actions, stop and
solve crimes, data from operational and investigative work, recognized by the appropri-
ate procedure as evidence in criminal cases of this category, may be actively used.").
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or her relatives' or co-residents' records of financial activities
and transactions, without the obstacle of banking and commer-
cial confidentiality requirements. 168  Extraordinary measures,
such as denying bail or detaining suspects up to thirty days with-
out formal charges, can be taken against individuals engaged in
organized criminal groups.1 69  The Decree gave governmental
authorities power to inspect buildings and premises of enter-
prises, institutions, and organizations suspected of criminal activ-
ities, and to inspect their documentation.1 70  The Decree also
required executive authorities throughout the Russian Federa-
tion to draw a list of localities that required special attention, to
assign additional law enforcement personnel in these localities,
and to apportion funds in order to provide such personnel with
material incentives. 171
168. See id. (noting that law enforcement agencies will disregard confidentiality
laws in their fight against organized crime). This part of Article 1 states:
[B]anking or commercial confidentiality shall not prevent the procuracy, in-
ternal affairs or counterintelligence bodies or the tax police from obtaining,
through a procedure established by them, information and documents on the
financial and economic activity, deposits and account operations of physical
and legal persons involved in bandit assaults or other serious crimes commit-
ted by organized criminal groups.
Id.
169. See id. (" [w] ritten undertaking not to leave the area, a personal guaranty or
guaranty provided by a public organization, or bail may not be applied as restrictive
measures against those suspected or accused of the aforementioned crimes, they may
be detained for up to thirty days.").
170. See id. ("[a]uthorized representatives of the bodies of internal affairs and
counterintelligence have the right to inspect the buildings and premises of enterprises,
institutions and organizations regardless of forms of ownership and to familiarize them-
selves with documents pertaining to their activity as well as to examine transport facili-
ties, their drivers and passengers.").
171. Id. art. 2. Article 2 states:
_[Tihe heads of executive authorities in the component parts of the Russian
Federation are to draw up a list of towns and individual localities to be placed
under special control because of the prevalence in those areas of banditry and
other manifestations of organized crime. They are to advise ministries, inter-
nal affairs directorates and directorates of the Federal Counterintelligence
Service to place officers and men of the internal affairs and counterintel-
ligence bodies in those towns and localities on an intensified operational foot-
ing for the purpose of conducting special operations in the drive against ban-
ditry and other manifestations of organized crime. They are to make funds
available for the specific purpose of providing material incentives for internal
affairs and counterintelligence personnel and the Interior Ministry forces tak-
ing part in special operations against banditry and other manifestations of or-
ganized crime, as well as for personnel engaged in intensive duties in towns
and individual localities.
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Russian civil rights activists criticized the Decree, arguing
that it interfered with a number of rights and freedoms and vio-
lated the Constitution of the Russian Federation.17 Dismissing
the criticism of the Decree, the head of the Russian counterintel-
ligence service claimed that while it was true that the measure
restricted certain civil rights, it also protected other vital human
rights critical to ninety-nine percent of the Russian population
not engaged in criminal behavior.173 Likewise, FBI Director
Louis Freeh expressed his unconditional support for the Decree,
expressing that the presidential measure harmoniously com-
bined a respect for human rights with a necessity to protect the
security of ordinary people.174 In 1995, the head of the Chief
Administration for Combating Organized Crime in Russia de-
clared that efforts resulting from the Decree were successful and
it had dealt a blow to Russian organized criminal groups.' 75
2. Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and
Subsequent Measures
On May 24, 1996, the Russian State Duma' 76 adopted the
Id.
172. See Victor Shabalin et al., The New Stage of the Fight Against Organized Crime in
Russia (visited Sept. 14, 1999) <http://members.tripod.com/-orgcrime/rusnewstage.
htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (noting that some members of
Parliament spoke against Decree); see also KONST. RF (1994), art. 22(2) ("Arrest, deten-
tion, and keeping in custody shall be allowed only by an order of a court of law. No
person may be detained for more than 48 hours without an order of a court of law.");
Jankiewicz, supra note 106, at 254 (noting that Russian Federation Chairman on
Human Rights stated that "implementation of the edict would be accompanied by arbi-
trary actions by law-enforcement departments-unjustified arrests, interference in citi-
zens' private and economic activities, and a growth in corruption among officials.").
173. See LAvARD & PARKER, supra note 29, at 169 (explaining that other countries
facing similar problems also resorted to drastic anti-crime measures).
174. See Asnis, supra note 69, at 312 (noting that Decree came into force from
moment it was signed, as no Duma approval was necessary).
175. SeeJankiewicz, supra note 106, at 256 (quoting Mikhail Yegorov, head of Chief
Administration for Combating Organized Crime ("CACOC"), as stating that "26,500
mafiosi have passed through the hands of CACOC personnel"). CACOC reported that
during the first year after the Decree came into effect, the Russian authorities detained
22,400 people and instituted 11,000 criminal cases. Id. At the same time, CACOC
claimed that only 202 human rights complaints were filed during that time period. Id.
176. See KoNsT. RF (1994) art. 95 (stating that "[t]he Federal Assembly [Parlia-
ment of the Russian Federation] shall consist of two chambers-the Federation Council
and the State Duma."); see also id. art. 94 (stating that The Federal Assembly-Parlia-
ment of the Russian Federation-shall be the supreme representative and legislative
body of the Russian Federation.").
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first post-Soviet Russian Criminal Code.17 7 The Criminal Code
contains many important provisions necessary to fight Russian
organized crime.'78 Articles 209 and 210 of the Criminal Code,
for example, specifically address the problem of banditism and
organized crime.179
Article 209 of the Criminal Code provides that creation or
leadership of a stable armed group for the purpose of assaulting
individuals or organizations is punishable by a prison term of up
to fifteen years, with possible confiscation of an individual's
property.1 80 Participation in such criminal groups may lead to
imprisonment for the term of eight to fifteen years, with or with-
out confiscation of property. 181  A harsher punishment of twelve
to twenty years in prison is reserved for individuals who use their
official positions to participate in such armed groups.1 2
While Article 209 of the Criminal Code concerns banditism
and stable armed groups, Article 210 specifically addresses or-
ganized crime. 18  According to the Criminal Code, the creation
of criminal organizations with the aim of committing grave or
especially grave crimes, and leadership in such organizations or
their subdivisions, is punishable by a prison term of seven to fif-
teen years, with possible confiscation of personal property.
184
177. CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 157.
178. Id.
179. See id. arts. 209 ("Banditism"), 210 ("Organisation of Criminal Society (or
Criminal Organisation)").
180. Id. art. 209(1). Article 209(1) states:
The creation of a stable armed group (or band) for the purpose of an attack
upon citizens or organisations, and likewise the leadership of such a group (or
band)-shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of from ten up
to fifteen years with or without confiscation of property.
Id.
181. See id. art. 209(2) ("Participation in a stable armed group (or band) or in the
attacks committed by it-shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of from
eight up to fifteen years with or without confiscation of property.").
182. See id. 209(3) ("The acts provided for by paragraphs one or two of the present
Article committed by a person with the use of his employment [official] position-shall
be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of from twelve up to twenty years with
or without confiscation of property."). The Criminal Code does not define the term
official position or the extent to which it has to be used for an individual to receive a
harsher punishment. Id.
183. Id. art. 210.
184. Id. art. 210(1). Article 210(1) states:
The creation of a criminal society (or criminal organisation) in order to com-
mit grave or especially grave crimes, and likewise the leadership of such a soci-
ety (or organisation) or structural subdivisions therein, and also the creation
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Participation in such criminal enterprises is likewise punishable
by imprisonment for three to ten years with possible confiscation
of property.18 5  Individuals whose participation in organized
criminal groups coincides with their duties as public officials are
punished more severely: ten to twenty years in prison, with or
without confiscation of property.1 8 6 Nevertheless, while some ex-
perts believe that the anti-organized criminal provisions of the
Criminal Code represent a good basis for fighting Russian or-
ganized crime,lay others claim that the Criminal Code is some-
what ambiguous and fails to provide definitions for important
terms, such as creation or participation."' 8 In addition, certain
provisions appear unduly restrictive.'89 Article 210, for example,
only punishes suspects accused of committing grave or especially
grave crimes, and it is not clear what punishment, if any, applies
to organized criminal groups committing crimes that cannot be
classified as grave or especially grave.19°
Other articles in the Criminal Code, while not specifically
addressing organized criminal groups, deal with other activities
normally associated with criminal organizations.191 Article 30
addresses crimes of conspiracy, facilitation, complicity, and prep-
of an association of organisers, leaders, and other representatives of organised
groups for the purpose of working out plans and conditions for the commis-
sion of grave or especially grave crimes-shall be punished by deprivation of
freedom for a term of from seven up to fifteen years with or without confisca-
tion of property.
Id.
185. See id. art. 210(2) ("Participation in a criminal society (or criminal organisa-
tion) or in an association of organisers, leaders, or other representatives of organised
groups-shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of from three up to ten
years with or without confiscation of property.").
186. See id. art. 210(3) ("The acts provided for by paragraphs one or two of the
present Article committed by a person with the use of his employment position-shall
be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of from ten up to twenty years with or
without confiscation of property.").
187. See Frisby, supra note 26, at 40 (noting that Criminal Code presents strong
legal foundation for future anti-crime campaigns).
188. See Cormaney, supra note 30, at 295 (indicating that narrowly defined require-
ment of "stable armed group" will significantly limit article's application).
189. Id.
190. CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 157, art. 210.
191. See id. art. 30 ("Preparation for Crime and Attempted Crime"), 32 ("Concept
of Conspiracy in Crime"), 33 ("Types of Conspirators in Crime"), 35 ("Commission of
Crime by Group of Persons, by Group of Persons by Prior Collusion, by Organized
Group, or by Criminal Society (or Criminal Organization")).
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aration for a crime. 19 2 Article 32 of the Criminal Code addresses
and defines complicity and conspiracy--knowing and joint par-
ticipation of two or more individuals in commission of a
crime.193 Article 33 concerns accomplices, such as organizers,
instigators, and facilitators.' 9 4 Finally, Article 35 addresses the
commission of crimes by groups of people or through organized
criminal groups or organizations.'95 It provides that, under cer-
192. Id. art. 30. Article 30 states:
1. Preparation for a crime shall be deemed to be the finding, manufacture, or
outfitting of a person with the means or implements for commission of a
crime, the finding of conspirators of a crime, collusion in the commission of a
crime, or other intentional creation of conditions for the commission of a
crime if in so doing the crime was not brought to the end under circumstances
beyond the control of this person. 2. Criminal responsibility shall ensue only
for the preparation for grave and especially grave crimes. 3. An attempted
crime shall be deemed to be intentional actions (or failure to act) of a person
directly aimed at the commission of a crime if in so doing the crime was not
brought to an end under circumstances beyond the control of this person.
Id. Article 30 defines the crimes without providing for specific punishment. Id.
193. See id. art. 32 ("The intentional joint participation of two or more persons in
the commission of an intentional crime shall be deemed to be conspiracy in a crime.").
194. Id. art. 33. Article 33 states:
1. The organizer, the instigator, and the accessory shall, together, with the
perpetrator, be deemed to be conspirators in a crime. 2. A person who has
directly committed a crime or directly participated in the commission thereof
jointly with other persons (co-perpetrators), and also a person who has com-
mitted a crime by means of the use of other persons who are not subject to
criminal responsibility by virtue of age, non-imputability, or other circum-
stances provided for by the present Code, shall be deemed to be a perpetrator.
3. A person who has organized the commission of a crime or directed the
perpetration thereof, and likewise a person who has created an organized
group or criminal society (or criminal organisation) or directed them, shall be
deemed to be an organizer. 4. A person who inclined another person to com-
mit a crime by means of persuasion, bribe, threat, or other means shall be
deemed to be an instigator. 5. A person who has facilitated the commission of
a crime by advice, instructions, the granting of information, means, or imple-
ments for committing the crime or by the elimination of obstacles, and also a
person who promised beforehand to conceal the criminal, means, or imple-
ments for commission of the crime, traces of the crime, or articles acquired by
criminal means, and likewise a person who promised beforehand to acquire or
sell such articles, shall be deemed to be an accessory.
Id.
195. Id. art. 35. Article 35 states:
1. A crime shall be deemed to be committed by a group of persons if two or
more perpetrators without prior collusion jointly participated in the commis-
sion thereof. 2. A crime shall be deemed to be committed by a group of per-
sons by prior collusion if the persons who agreed beforehand to the joint com-
mission of the crime participated therein. 3. A crime shall be deemed to be
committed by an organised group if it was committed by a stable group of
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tain circumstances, organizers and non-participating members
of a criminal enterprise are liable for the crimes committed by
other members of the group. 196
Article 174 of the Criminal Code concerns money and prop-
erty laundering. 9 7 It provides that financial transactions and
operations involving illegally acquired money or other kinds of
property, as well as use of such finances for entrepreneurial or
economic activity, is punishable by various fines and terms of im-
prisonment. 9 8 Harsher punishments are reserved for the com-
mission of such crimes by groups of individuals, for people con-
persons who combined beforehand to commit one or several crimes. 4. A
crime shall be deemed to be committed by a criminal society (or criminal
organisation) if it was committed by a cohesive organised group (or organisa-
Lion) created for the commission of grave or especially grave crimes or by the
combining of organised groups created for the same purposes. 5. A person
who has created an organised group or criminal society (or criminal organisa-
tion) or directed them shall be subject to criminal responsibility for the organ-
isation thereof and direction thereof in the instances provide for by respective
Articles of the Special Part of the present Code, and also for all the crimes
committed by the organized group (or criminal organisation) if they were en-
compassed by his intent. Other participants of an organised group or criminal
society (or criminal organisation) shall bear criminal responsibility for partici-
pation therein in the instances provided for by the respective Articles of the
Special Part of the present Code, and also for crimes in the participation or
commission of which they participated. 6. The creation of an organised group
in instances not provided for by the Articles of the Special Part of the present
Code shall entail criminal responsibility for the preparation of those crimes
for the commission of which it was created. 7. The commission of a crime by a
group of persons, by a group of persons by prior collusion, by an organised
group, or by a criminal society (or criminal organisation) shall entail a more
severe punishment on the basis of and within the limits provided for by the
present Code.
Id.
196. Id.
197. See id. art. 174 (referring to "Legalisation (or Laundering) of Monetary
Means or Other Property Acquired by Illegal Means").
198. Id. art. 174(1). Article 174(1) states:
The performance of financial operations and other transactions with mone-
tary means or other property known to have been acquired by illegal means,
and likewise the use of the said means or other property in order to effectuate
entrepreneurial or other economic activity-shall be punished by a fine in the
amount of from five hundred up to seven hundred minimum amounts of pay-
ment for labour or in the amount of the earnings or other revenue of the
convicted person for a term of from five up to seven months, or by deprivation
of freedom for a term of up to four years with or without a fine in the amount
of up to one hundred minimum amounts of payment for labour or in the
amount of the earnings or other revenue of the convicted person for a term of
up to one month.
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victed of multiple violations, for conspiratorial acts, and for per-
sons who committed such violations while performing their
official duties.' 99
Two articles of the Criminal Code specifically address inter-
national crimes.2 0 0 Article 13 provides that citizens of the Rus-
sian Federation who committed a crime in the territory of an-
other nation, cannot be extradited 2 1 to that jurisdiction. 20 2 At
the same time, stateless persons and citizens of other countries
who committed a crime abroad and currently claim their resi-
dence in the Russian Federation, may be extradited to a non-
Russian jurisdiction in accordance with treaty practice. 20 3 Article
12 also addresses the possibility of application of the Criminal
Code to people who commit their crimes outside the territory of
the Russian Federation and have not already been prosecuted
for such crimes.2 0 4
199. See id. art. 174(2) ("The same acts committed: (a) by a group of persons by
prior collusion; (b) repeatedly; (c) by a person with the use of his employment posi-
tion-shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of from four up to eight
years with or without confiscation of property.").
200. See id. art. 12 ("Operation of Criminal Law With Respect to Persons Who
Committed Crime Beyond Limits of Russian Federation"), 13 ("Extradition of Persons
Who Have Committed Crime").
201. See Warmund, supra note 134, at 2380 (defining extradition as "the surrender
of a criminal or accused criminal by one sovereign to another."). Extradition usually
occurs in accordance with a bilateral treaty. Id. at 2380-81. Most nations, however, have
laws that prohibit the extradition of their citizens. Id. at 2382.
202. See CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 157, art. 13(1) ("Citizens of the Russian Feder-
ation who have committed a crime on the territory of a foreign State shall not be sub-
ject to extradition to this State.").
203. Id. art. 13(2). Article 13(2) states:
Foreign citizens and stateless persons who have committed a crime beyond the
limits of the Russian Federation and are situated in the territory of the Russian
Federation may be extradited to the foreign State for bringing to criminal
responsibility or serving punishment in accordance with an international
treaty of the Russian Federation.
Id.
204. Id. art. 12. Article 12 states:
1. Citizens of the Russian Federation and stateless persons permanently resid-
ing in the Russian Federation who have committed a crime beyond the limits
of the Russian Federation shall be subject to criminal responsibility according
to the present Code if the act committed by them is deemed to be a crime in
the State on whose territory it was committed and if these persons were not
convicted in the foreign State. In the event of the conviction of the said per-
sons the punishment may not exceed upper limit of the sanction provided for
by the law of the foreign State on whose territory the crime was committed. 2.
Military servicemen of military units of the Russian Federation stationed be-
yond the limits of the Russian Federation shall, for crimes committed on the
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To supplement the Criminal Code, President Yeltsin signed
into law the new Criminal Correction Code 20 which is meant to
regulate the conditions under which convicted criminals serve
out their sentences. 206 In addition, on May 14, 1997, the Russian
Duma passed the first witness protection law in Russian his-
tory.207 Practitioners believe that the absence of personal secur-
ity of witnesses is a major barrier in criminal investigations,20 8
and the new witness protection law tried to solve this problem by
guaranteeing anonymity and security to witnesses in criminal in-
vestigations. 20 9  President Yeltsin, however, using the powers
territory of the foreign State, bear criminal responsibility according to the
present Code unless provided otherwise by international treaty of the Russian
Federation. 3. Foreign citizens and stateless persons who do not reside perma-
nently in the Russian Federation and who have committed a crime beyond the
limits of the Russian Federation shall be subject to criminal responsibility ac-
cording to the present Code in instances if the crime was directed against the
interests of the Russian Federation and, in instances provided for by an inter-
national treaty of the Russian Federation, if they were not convicted in the
foreign State and are brought to criminal responsibility on the territory of the
Russian Federation.
Id.
205. Ugolovno-Ispolnitel'niy Kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Correction Code), Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 2, Item 198.
206. Id.; see Stanislaw Pomorski, Reflections on the First Criminal Code of Post-Commu-
nist Russia, 46 AM. J. COMp. L. 375, 375 n.4 (1998) (noting that new Correction Code
was signed on January 8, 1997).
207. See Postanovlenie Gosudarstvennoy Dumi Federal'nogo Sobrania Rossiyskoy Federatsii
0 Federal'nom Zakone "0 Gosudarstvennoy Zaschite Poterpevshich, Svideteley i Drugich Lits,
Sodeystvuyuscich Ugolovnomu Sudoproizvodstvu" (Decision by the State Duma of the Rus-
sian Federation on Federal Law On State Protection of Victims, Witnesses and Other
Persons Assisting in Criminal Investigations), Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997, No. 21, Item
2433 (stating that State Duma of Russian Federation decides to adopt this law); see also
Postanovlenie Soveta Federatsii Federal'nogo Sobrania Rossiyskoy Federatsii 0 Federal'nom Zakone
"0 Gosudarstvennoy Zaschite Poterpevshich, Svideteley i Drugich Lits, Sodeystvuyuscich
Ugolovnomu Sudoproizvodstvu" (Decision by the Federation Council of the Russian Feder-
ation on Federal Law On State Protection of Victims, Witnesses and Other Persons
Assisting in Criminal Investigations), Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997, No. 25, Item 2817 (stat-
ing that Federation Council of Russian Federation approves adoption of this law).
208. Frisby, supra note 26, at 40.
209. See Proect, Federal'niy Zakon o Gosudarstvennoy Zaschite Poterpevshich, Svideteley I
Drugich Lits, Sodeystvuyuschich Ugolovnomu Sudoproizvodstvu, art. 5 (Draft of the Federal
Law On State Protection of Victims, Witnesses and Other Persons Assisting in Criminal
Investigations), available in Information Channel of the State Duma of the Russian Fed-
eration (visited Sept. 17, 1999) <www.akdi.ru/gd/proekt/079202GD.HTM> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating that measures of protection applied
to protected persons will include confidentiality of information provided by such per-
sons, personal protection, provision of firearms to protected persons, relocation, re-
placement of personal identification documents, and change of employment).
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granted to him by Article 107 of the Russian Constitution,2 1' re-
jected this law. 1 Commentators note that despite the new laws
and initiatives, enforcement of these provisions against Russian
organized crime remains inadequate. 212 On July 13, 1997, it was
reported by news agencies that 100,000 people, belonging to
9000 organized criminal groups, were under surveillance by Rus-
sian law enforcement authorities, but could not be arrested due
to the lack of sufficient evidence necessary for their indict-
ment.2
13
C. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
MLATs are legal mechanisms that have often been used by
U.S. law enforcement agencies in the last few decades to address
the problem of transnational organized crime.214 U.S. authori-
ties have successfully used joint prosecution and legal coopera-
tion with Israel to avoid the narrow scope of Israel's non-extradi-
tion law.21 ' The United States and Italy employed the MLAT be-
tween the two nations to jointly prosecute major criminal cases
dealing with international illegal activities. 216 The Treaty on Mu-
210. KONST. RF (1994), art. 107. Article 107 states:
1. An adopted federal law shall be sent to the President of the Russian Federa-
tion for signing and publication within five days.
2. The President of the Russian Federation shall, within fourteen days, sign a
federal law and publish it.
3. If the President rejects a federal law within fourteen days since it was sent to
him, the State Duma and the Federation Council shall again consider the law
in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution of the Rus-
sian Federation. If, during the second hearings, the federal law shall be ap-
proved in its earlier draft by a majority of not less than two thirds of the total
number of deputies of the Federation Council and the State Duma, it shall be
signed by the President of the Russian Federation within seven days and pub-
lished.
Id.
211. See Zakonoproekti, Otklonennie Prezidentom RF (Laws Rejected by the President of
RF), available in Information Channel of the State Duma of the Russian (visited Sept.
17, 1999) <www.akdi.ru/gd/proekt/079202GD.HTM> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) (noting that President Yeltsin rejected this law on June 27, 1997).
212. Frisby, supra note 26, at 40.
213. Id.
214. See Knapp, supra note 25, at 410-11 (comparing MLATs with preceding mech-
anisms of legal cooperation).
215. Abraham Abramovsky, Partners Against Crime: Joint Prosecutions of Israeli Organ-
ized Crime Figures By U.S. and Israeli Authorities, 19 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 1903, 1903 (1996)
216. See Jankiewicz, supra note 106, at 248-49 (discussing "Pizza Connection" case
and "Operation Green Ice").
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tual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between Hungary and
the United States" 7 ("Hungarian MLAT") also provides for obli-
gatory assistance designed to facilitate prosecution of members
of transnational organized crime.218
1. Definition and Legal Framework
Until a few decades ago, domestic authorities generally per-
formed criminal law enforcement.2 1 9 The main reason for this
situation was that the handling of international investigations
was, and still is, quite complicated, and cultural differences-
such as differing languages, manners, and customs-often make
it even more difficult.220 To complicate matters, the laws of cer-
tain countries prohibit the extradition of their nationals.2 2 1
One solution that has proven practical in partially eliminat-
ing problems of sovereignty and in identifying and creating legal
mechanisms to facilitate international cooperation is an
MIAT. 222 An MLAT is a bilateral agreement between two coun-
tries in which they agree to provide each other with assistance in
certain prosecutorial procedures, such as obtaining records,
serving documents, producing persons and physical evidence,
seizing and immobilizing assets, and executing search war-
22rants. 23 These agreements are binding and may, similarly to
217. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Dec. 1, 1994, U.S.-
Hung., No. KAV 4385, Senate Treaty Doc. No. 104-20, Exec. Rep. No. 104-25 [hereinaf-
ter Hungarian MLAT].
218. Id.
219. See Vassalo, supra note 54, at 181-82 (noting that jurisdiction and sovereignty
justified local approach). Classic international law dictated that one state could not
exercise its powers on the territory of another state. Id.
220. See Abramovsky, supra note 215, at 1903-04 (noting that evidence necessary
for prosecution of transnational crimes is spread across national boundaries).
221. Id. at 1904.
222. See generally Knapp, supra note 25, at 409-11 (stating that cooperation under
MLAT is more efficient than letters of rogatory). Letters of rogatory represent a tradi-
tional way of requesting production of evidence from another nation. Id. at 409. They
are submitted through diplomatic channels, "from ajudge in one country to ajudge in
another country to perform a specific act.... [which] might be ordering a witness to
testify, issuing a search warrant, or compelling the production of documents." Id. Prac-
titioners believe that letters of rogatory are inferior to MLATs. Id. at 409-11. Letters of
rogatory are time consuming, are subject to personal interpretation by lawyers of a re-
quested state, may not be available for a particular offense, cannot often overcome local
secrecy laws on producing documents, and sometimes cannot be used in grand jury
proceedings. Id. at 409-10.
223. See Abramovsky, supra note 128, at 207 (stating that MLATs are most compre-
hensive of all evidence-gathering processes).
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criminal investigations, cover assistance in related civil or admin-
istrative proceedings, 224 and establish a central authority in each
state to oversee compliance with its terms.225
MLATs first identify specific areas in which there is a need
for bilateral cooperation and then create legal frameworks to fa-
cilitate the exchange of relevant evidence and information.2 2 6
The state from which mutual legal assistance is requested usually
does not conduct a criminal procedure itself-it only supports
the procedure created and conducted by the requesting state.2 2 7
As a result, MLATs lead its signatories to surrender a certain de-
gree of sovereignty and to allow some foreign intrusion into tra-
ditionally domestic areas of crime control.228
The United States signed its first major MLAT in 1973 with
Switzerland, entitled the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Crimi-
nal Matters 229 ("U.S.-Swiss MLAT"). This treaty entered into
224. Knapp, supra note 25, at 406.
225. See Abramovsky, supra note 128, at 207-08 (noting that in United States this
authority is vested in U.S. Attorney General).
226. See Vassalo, supra note 54, at 188-89 (noting that requested evidence is pro-
vided more quickly because all requesting state has to do is contact representative of
requested state specified in the treaty). But see New MLAT Treaties Increase DOJ's Reach, 4
No. 7 DOJ ALERT 7, 9 (1994) (noting that success of MLAT depends on foreign govern-
ment's willingness to implement treaty's provisions).
227. See Judith Natterer, Switzerland's International Mutual Legal Assistance in Crimi-
nal Matters, Transparency International Working Paper (visited Aug. 3, 1999) <http://
www.transparency.de/documents/work-papers/natterer.html> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal) (noting that Switzerland, which performs its own admin-
istration of criminal justice on behalf of requesting state, is exception to this principle).
Swiss legal authorities exercise their own penal authority over subjects of transnational
investigations. Id. Transparency International is a non-governmental organization, the
declared goal of which is to increase government accountability and curb international
and national corruption. Id.
228. See Vassalo, supra note 54, at 188 (stating that provisions in MLAT between
United States and Switzerland take precedence over all national laws).
229. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27
U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Swiss MLAT]; see also Russian Corruption and Money Laundering:
Hearings Before the House Banking and Financial Services Comm., 106th Cong. (1999), avail-
able in 1999 WL 27594670, exhibit B (testimony of James K. Robinson, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department ofJustice) (noting that United States
currently has MLATs in force with Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Can-
ada, Cayman Islands, Grenada, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Lithuania, Mexico, Mo-
rocco, Netherlands, Panama, Philippines, Poland, St. Vincent, South Korea, Spain, Swit-
zerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Uruguay). MLATs with Australia,
Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Es-
tonia, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Latvia, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Romania, Russia, St.
Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, South Africa, Trinidad-Tobago, Ukraine, and Venezuela have
been signed but are not yet in force. Id.
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force in 1977230 and created an obligation on both states to assist
each other in the fight against transnational crime. 231 The pur-
pose of the treaty was to give the United States access to evidence
usually protected by the Swiss banking secrecy laws.232 The en-
actment of the U.S.-Swiss MLAT helped U.S. authorities to
gather evidence that led to successful prosecutions of several
cases in the United States.233
2. Israel
Under the Offences Committed Abroad Law of 1978,234 Is-
raeli nationals cannot be extradited from Israel for crimes com-
mitted abroad.235 The Israeli government adopted this law in
order to offset the danger of Israeli citizens suffering from anti-
Semitism in non-Israeli courts, 2 3 6 but the law also produced the
unintended effect of turning Israel into a safe haven for mem-
bers of organized crime who viewed the country as a desirable
destination after commission of crimes outside of Israel.237 A
three-year-old case, however, provides an example of how law en-
forcement authorities from the United States and Israel can co-
230. Swiss MLAT, supra note 229.
231. See id. art. 1 ("Obligation to Furnish Assistance"). Article 1 of the treaty de-
clares that "[t]he Contracting Parties undertake to afford each other, in accordance
with provisions of this Treaty, mutual assistance ...." Id.
232. See Vassalo, supra note 54, at 189 (noting that Switzerland's strict bank secrecy
laws facilitated hiding criminal funds).
233. See id. at 190 (providing as example case of United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d
1466 (6th Cir. 1991), in which suspects were accused of tax evasion, filing false income
tax returns, and distribution of pornography).
234. Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) Law, 1973, 32
L.S.I. 63, (1978).
235. Id. art. 2, 3. The amendment to this law states that:
[i]n the Extradition Law ... (1) the following section shall be inserted after
section 1: IA. An Israeli national shall not be extradited save for an offence
[sic] committed before he became an Israeli national .... 3. Section 1 shall
apply also to an offence [sic] committed by a person before the coming into
force of this Law provided that a request for his extradition has been made
and has been rejected by reason only of his Israeli nationality.
Id.
236. Abramovsky, supra note 215, at 1908.
237. See id. (noting that Israel is not usually associated with organized crime).
With time, however, Israeli organized crime grew and expanded into the United States.
Id. at 1909-10. It is now active in such U.S. cities, as Boston, Los Angeles, Miami, and
NewYork. Id. at 1909. Due to the large Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union, and
later Russia, to Israel, Russian and Israeli organized criminal groups became "natural
partners." Id. at 1910.
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operate in order to combat and bring to justice members of in-
ternational criminal organizations.238
In 1989, two Israeli organized crime members, Israel
Mizrahi and Joseph Reisch, were hired by the Italian Mafia to kill
Michael Markowitz, a Russian mobster residing in New York.23 9
The murder took place on May 3, 1989,240 after which the
criminals were able to escape the United States, and later ap-
peared in Israel. 241  There, Israeli and U.S. prosecutors began
the process that one international criminal law expert believes to
be the largest joint prosecution effort against Israeli organized
crime figures for crimes committed abroad.242 The same expert
stated that the cooperation in this case set new standards of in-
ternational cooperation directed at eliminating transnational or-
243ganized crime.
Israeli prosecutors prepared and conducted the actual pros-
ecution of the case,244 but law enforcement authorities in the
United States gathered most of the evidence. 245 U.S. prosecu-
tors also served as expert witnesses, testifying about the U.S. law
238. Id. at 1903.
239. Israel v. Mizrahi and Reisch, Tel Aviv-Yafo Dist. Ct., Felony File 503/93
(Mizrahi), 200/94 (Reisch) (Israel). See Abramovsky, supra note 215, at 1903-05 (not-
ing that charges against defendants were technically separate, but they were tried to-
gether).
240. Abramovsky, supra note 215, at 1906. See Robert E. Kessler, 2 Fugitives Arrested;
Caught in Israel, They're Wanted by Feds on LI, NEWSDAY, Nov. 30, 1993, at 31 (noting that
Michael Markowitz was a key figure in gasoline bootlegging scheme, but later became
government informant). Assistant U.S. Attorney Cecilia Gardner said that Israel
Mizrahi killed Markowitz "to prevent the communication... to a federal law enforce-
ment officer of information related to the commission and possible commission of fed-
eral offenses." Kessler, supra.
241. See Kessler, supra note 240, at 31 (noting that Mizrahi was also charged with
murder of member of heroin smuggling ring).
242. See Abramovsky, supra note 215, at 1910-11 (positing that, interestingly, Is-
raeli-U.S. cooperation in this case started before murder of Markowitz, as law enforce-
ment agencies of both countries investigated activities of Israeli and Russian criminal
groups).
243. See id. at 1903 (noting that almost seven years passed between murder and
actual prosecution).
244. See id. at 1911 (stating that Israeli prosecutors conduct examination of wit-
nesses).
245. See id. (noting that United States also provided star witnesses in this case, who
were former gangsters enrolled in Federal Witness Protection Program); see also Israelis
Arrest Accused Tax Thief, Mob Murderer, 30 U.S. OIL WEEK, No. 48, Dec. 6, 1993, available
in 1993 WL 2727357 (noting that while Israel has no extradition treaty, suspects could
be tried in Israel with assistance of U.S. authorities).
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enforcement system and criminal procedure.2 4 6 Ironically, both
defendants were acquitted on the murder charges, but the trial
and cooperation of the U.S. and Israeli authorities served as a
good model for international criminal law enforcement coopera-
tion.247
On the opposite side of the Atlantic, U.S. law enforcement
authorities received the help of their Israeli colleagues in prose-
cuting the owner of a limousine agency in Brookline, Massachu-
setts, whose main activity concerned drug trafficking. 248 The
criminal enterprise consisted of fourteen Israelis living in differ-
ent cities in the United States and in Europe.249 Israeli police
aided U.S. efforts by monitoring wiretaps and providing informa-
tion about the suspects' criminal past in Israel.25 °
Significantly, all of these prosecutions occurred in the ab-
sence of an official MLAT between Israel and the United
States.251 On January 26, 1998, however, the new Treaty between
the United States and Israel on Mutual Legal Assistance in Crim-
inal Matters252 was signed in Jerusalem. 253 Practitioners believe
246. See Abramovsky, supra note 215, at 1911 (noting that U.S. prosecutors assist-
ing in this case were Eric Seidel and Cecilia Gardner).
247. See id. at 1917 (stating that court reiterated that substantial evidence pointed
to defendants' guilt, and they were not convicted due to reasonable doubt alone).
248. See id. at 1917-18 (elaborating that U.S. authorities actually shared US$35,000
in forfeited money with Israeli National Police); see also Frank Scott, "The Israeli Connec-
tion": Drug Bust Brings Profit, JEwISH ADVOc., July 6, 1995, at 1 (noting that special treaty
called for Israel to use money "to promote law enforcement efforts to control and elimi-
nate drug trafficking and other narcotics-related criminal activities").
249. See Abramovsky, supra note 215, at 1917 (noting that criminal group allegedly
cooperated with Colombian drug traffickers); see also US Shares Proceeds from Drug Bust
with Israel; Police Forces Catch Israeli-led Gang, JERUSALEM POST, June 29, 1995, at 12 (stat-
ing that it is believed to be first time that confiscated assets were shared between two
governments).
250. See Abramovsky, supra note 215, at 1917-18 (noting that one member of crimi-
nal enterprises was apprehended and convicted in Israel). U.S. prosecutors did not
participate in this particular trial. Id.; see also Scott, supra note 248, at 1 (noting that
Israeli National Police provided instant translations of Hebrew conversations recorded
on wiretaps).
251. See US, Israel Sign Crime-Fighting Pact, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 26, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 2208440 (noting that MLAT between United States and Israel was
signed on January 26, 1998).
252. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 26, 1998, U.S.-
Isr., No. KAV 5204, Senate Treaty Doc. No. 10540.
253. See US, Israel Sign Crime-Fighting Pact, supra note 251 (noting that M[AT be-
tween Israel and United States had been negotiated since 1994); see also Extradition,
Mutual Legal Assistance, and Prisoner Transfer Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 11-13 (1998) (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy As-
204 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:165
that the above cases clearly show how joint prosecutions and
transnational legal enforcement cooperation are effective in
curbing the activities of international criminal enterprises. 5 4
3. Italy
In 1982, the United States and Italy signed a Treaty of Mu-
tual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters255 ("Italian MLAT").
The treaty primarily focuses upon Italian organized crime. 5 6
The Italian MLAT requires both parties to provide assistance in
criminal investigations and proceedings.25 7 It requires all agen-
cies involved in criminal investigations to file their requests for
assistance with the Attorney General of the United States.258
Practitioners note that the Italian MLAT helped in the pros-
ecution of United States v. Badalamenti,259 the notorious Pizza Con-
nection case, in which defendants used pizza parlors as covers for
criminal activities. 260  In this case, the government accused
twenty defendants of smuggling US$1.6 billion of heroin into
sistant Attorney General, Dep't of Justice) (stating that MLATs are effective tools in
fight against internationalization of crime).
254. See generally Abramovsky, supra note 215, at 1903 (stating that "[t]he saga of
[Mizrahi's and Reisch's] trial illustrates the increasingly intricate world of international
organized crime, and provides an example of law enforcement professionals from dif-
fering legal systems combining their efforts against members of international criminal
enterprises.").
255. Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 9, 1982, U.S.-
Italy, 24 I.L.M. 1536 [hereinafter Italian MLAT].
256. See Vassalo, supra note 54, at 191 (noting that purpose of Italian MLAT was
different from that of Swiss MLAT). While the Swiss MLAT concentrated on bank se-
crecy laws, the Italian MLAT was designed to fight organized crime. Id.
257. See Italian MLAT, supra note 255, art. 1 ("The Contracting Parties undertake
to afford each other, upon request and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty,
mutual assistance in criminal investigations and proceedings.").
258. See id. art. 2 ("A request under this Treaty shall be made by a Central Author-
ity for each Contracting Party. The Central Authorities shall communicate directly with
each other to implement the provisions of this Treaty.").
259. United States v. Badalamenti, No. 84 Cr. 236 (PNL) (S.D.N.Y. 1987); United
States v. Badalamenti, 626 F. Supp. 658, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v. Badala-
menti, 626 F. Supp. 655, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), United States v. Badalamenti, 663 F.
Supp. 1539 (1987).
260. See Richard A. Martin, Problems in International Law Enforcement, 14 FORDrAM
INT'L L.J. 519, 522 (1991) (noting that law enforcement authorities from Brazil, Can-
ada, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and United States worked on this case for al-
most one year); see also "Pizza Connection" Defendant Found Slain on N.Y. Street; Drug Trial
Thrown into Confusion, WASH. PosT, Dec. 3, 1986, at A5 (noting that defendants set up
pizza parlors in Midwest and Northeast of United States).
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the United States. 261' Gaetano Badalamenti, one of the master-
minds of the drug ring, and his associates in Italy purchased
opium from Pakistan and Afghanistan, transformed it into her-
oin, and then transferred it to the United States.262 In the trial,
which lasted seventeen months, U.S. prosecutors employed the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 2 6 3 to fight
the Italian Mafia. 264 The Italian MLAT even allowed for the live
testimony of two Italian citizens in the United States.2 65 The trial
involved 15,000 exhibits and 41,000 pages of testimony of 250
witnesses. 266 On March 3, 1987, the jury convicted eighteen of
the remaining nineteen defendants of operating a narcotics
ring.
2 6 7
Another big case directly affected by the Italian MLAT was
Operation Green Ice 2 6 8 -which some experts believe to be the most
sophisticated international money laundering case ever under-
taken by law enforcement officials-that took place in Septem-
ber 1992.269 The case was intended to break the international
261. See "Pizza Connection" Trial Drags On, CHicAGo TRIB., Oct. 9, 1986, at 30 (stat-
ing that full trial was translated for defendants who did not speak English). Two of the
22 original defendants in the case pleaded guilty to lesser charges. Id.
262. See Extra Cheese; Busting a Pizza Connection, TIME, Apr. 23, 1984, at 41 (noting
that Pietro Alfano, residing in United States, was second mastermind of drug ring); see
also Defendant Found Slain, supra note 260, at A5 (noting that Gaetano Mazzara, missing
defendant in drug trial, was killed in New York); "Pizza Connection"Defendant Shot in City,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 12, 1987, at 17 (stating that another defendant in this case was wounded
by unidentified gunmen).
263. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1970).
264. SeeJankiewicz, supra note 106, at 248 (noting that these efforts led to arrest of
366 suspects and 338 convictions in Italy). Louis Freeh, then U.S. Attorney and now the
Director of the FBI, participated in that case. Id.
265. See Vassalo, supra note 54, at 191 (noting that Italian MLAT facilitated trans-
fer of foreign witnesses). These two Italian nationals were Tommaso Buscetta and Sal-
vatore Contorno. Id.
266. See Margot Hornblower, 18 Guilty in "Pizza Connection" Trial; Case Called Major
Victory in U.S. Assault on Organized Crime, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1987, at A3 (quoting U.S.
Attorney Rudolph W. Giuliani as saying "[i]t is [sic] tremendous victory in the effort to
crush the Mafia. Five years ago nobody would have thought it possible to convict the
head of the Sicilian Mafia and the head of a major part of an American Mafia family.").
267. See "Pizza Connection" Convictions Seen as Crushing Blow to Mafia, SEATTLE TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1987, at A2 (noting that judge excused one juror from case after juror's relative
was threatened).
268. SeeJankiewicz, supra note 106, at 249 (describing Operation Green Ice).
269. See Michael Hedges, Operation Green Ice Began with Fake Leather Shop, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at A3 (noting that operation started when law enforcement au-
thorities opened phony leather-goods store, which offered to launder money for
criminals).
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money laundering conspiracy orchestrated by South American
drug cartels and the Italian Mafia, and it involved undercover
U.S. and Italian agents posing as bankers and criminals trying to
penetrate criminal organizations. 270 As the result of the opera-
tion, law enforcement authorities arrested members of Italian
and Colombian criminal groups. 271 The two-year long interna-
tional investigation led to 167 arrests and US$54 million of
seized cash and assets. 2 7 2 The Italian MLAT let the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration agents testify in the United States
for the prosecution that was taking place in Italy.
2 73
4. Hungary
The United States and the Republic of Hungary signed the
Hungarian MLAT in Budapest on December 1, 1994.274 The
drafters designed the Hungarian MLAT, like all other MLATs, to
facilitate prosecution of a wide variety of criminal activities.2 75
The provisions of the Hungarian MLAT are similar to those of
other MLATs signed by the United States.27 6
The scope of obligations of the parties under the Hun-
garian MLAT includes a non-exhaustive list of the major types of
assistance, including taking testimony of persons, serving docu-
ments, locating or identifying persons, transferring persons in
custody, executing requests for searches and seizures, and assist-
270. Jankiewicz, supra note 106, at 249.
271. Hedges, supra note 269, at A3.
272. See Operation Green Ice Score: Good Guys-167, Cartels-O, 2 TACTICAL TECHNOL-
OGY No. 21, Oct. 14, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2308969 (noting that operation resulted
in arrests of top-ranking Colombian cartel managers in Costa Rica, Italy, Spain, and
United States). According to one official, "Operation Green Ice and the other initia-
tives have resulted in the global disruption of the Cali and Medellin cartels, the most
powerful drug trafficking organizations in the history of the world." Id.
273. SeeJankiewicz, supra note 106, at 249 (noting that Operation Green Ice and
Pizza Connection are examples of how cooperation can be used to combat organized
crime).
274. Hungarian MLAT, supra note 217. This treaty was ratified on March 18, 1997.
Id.
275. See id., Letter of Transmittal ("The Treaty should be an effective tool to assist
in the prosecution of a wide variety of modern criminals, including members of drug
cartels, 'white-collar' criminals, and terrorists.").
276. See id. ("In recent years, similar bilateral treaties have been entered into force
with Argentina, the Bahamas, Canada, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, the Nether-
lands, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom (concerning the Cay-
man Islands), and Panama.").
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ing in asset proceedings. 277 The Hungarian MLAT specifically
states that it is intended solely for mutual legal assistance be-
tween the United States and Hungary. 278 The Hungarian MLAT
does not have a dual criminality requirement, meaning that
assistance in prosecuting a specific criminal act should be pro-
vided without regard to whether such offense would constitute a
crime under the laws of the Requested State. 2 79
The Hungarian MLAT provides for establishment of central
authorities, which are the Attorney General in the United States,
Hungary's Minister of Justice and the Chief Public Prosecutor,
or people designated by them, for making and receiving re-
quests.2 8 ° Article 3 of the Hungarian MLAT provides circum-
stances when requests for assistance may be denied, and those
situations include the exceptions for political offenses, offenses
under military law, and requests that may prejudice the sover-
eignty or security of the Requested State. 21  The Hungarian
277. Id. art. 1(2). Article 1(2) states:
Assistance shall include: (a) taking the testimony or statements of persons;
(b) providing documents, records, and articles of evidence; (c) serving docu-
ments; (d) locating or identifying persons or items; (e) transferring persons in
custody for testimony or other purposes; (f) executing requests for searches
and seizures; (g) immobilizing assets; (h) assisting in proceedings related to
forfeiture, restitution, and collection of fines; and (i) any other form of assist-
ance not prohibited by the laws of the Requested State.
Id.
278. See id. art. 1(4) ("This Treaty is intended solely for mutual legal assistance
between the Parties. The provisions of this Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the
part of any private person to obtain, suppress, or exclude any evidence, or to impede
the execution of a request.").
279. See id. art. 1(3) ("Assistance shall be provided without regard to whether the
conduct which is the subject of the investigation, prosecution, or proceeding in the
Requesting State would constitute an offense under the laws of the Requested State.").
280. Id. art. 2. Article 2 states:
1. Each Contracting party shall have a Central Authority to make and receive
requests pursuant to this Treaty. 2. For the United States of America, the Cen-
tral Authority shall be the Attorney General or such persons, designated by the
Attorney General. For the Republic of Hungary, the Central Authority shall
be the Minister of Justice and the Chief Public Prosecutor or such persons
designated by them.
Id.
281. Id. art. 3(1). Article 3(1) states:
The Central Authority of the Requested State may deny assistance if: (a) the
request relates to a political offense; (b) the request relates to an offense
under military law which would not be an offense under ordinary criminal law;
(c) the execution of the request is likely to prejudice the sovereignty security
or similar essential interests of the Requested State; or (d) the request does
not comply with the provisions of Article 4.
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MLAT provides specific guidance for form, contents of re-
quests,2 8 2 and their execution.28 3 The Hungarian MLAT obli-
gates the Requested State to do everything possible to execute
the request,2 4 and such execution will be performed under the
laws of the Requested State, unless otherwise provided by the
treaty. 28
5
The Hungarian MLAT states that the Requested State must
pay all costs associated with the execution of the request, except
for certain fees of expert witnesses, costs of translation and inter-
pretation, and expenses related to travel of persons under the
treaty. 2 6 The evidence obtained under the Hungarian MLAT
can only be used in investigation or prosecution described in the
request, and the Requested State may demand for it to be kept
confidential. 28 v The treaty may compel the taking of testimony
or production of documents in its territory upon the request of
the Requesting State. 2 8 Even if a person asserts a claim of im-
munity or privilege under the laws of the Requesting State, the
Id.
282. See id. art. 4 ("A request for assistance shall be in writing except that the Cen-
tral Authority of the Requested State may accept a request in another form in urgent
situations.").
283. See id. art. 5(1) ("The Central Authority of the Requested State shall promptly
execute the request or, when appropriate, transmit it to the authority having jurisdic-
tion to do so.").
284. See id. ("The competent authorities of the Requested State shall do everything
in their power to execute the request.").
285. See id. art. 5(3) ("Requests shall be executed in accordance with the laws of
the Requested State except to the extent that this Treaty provides otherwise. The
method of execution specified in the request shall be followed except insofar as it is
prohibited by the laws of the Requested State.").
286. See id. art. 6 ("The Requested State shall pay all costs relating to the execution
of the request except for the fees of expert witnesses, the costs of translation, interpreta-
tion, and transcription, and the allowances and expenses related to travel of persons.").
287. Id. art. 7. Article 7 states:
1. The Central Authority of the Requested State may require that any informa-
tion or evidence obtained under this Treaty not be used in any investigation,
prosecution, or proceeding other than that described in the request without
the prior consent of the Requested State. 2. The Central Authority of the
Requested State may request that information or evidence furnished under
this Treaty be kept confidential or be used in accordance with conditions
which its Central Authority shall specify.
Id.
288. See id. art. 8(1) ("A person in the Requested State from whom evidence is
requested pursuant to this Treaty shall be compelled, if necessary, to appear and testify
or produce any item, including, but not limited to, documents, records, and articles of
evidence.").
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Requested State can still take the testimony, but the claim must
be made known to the Requesting State for resolution by its au-
thorities.289
The Hungarian MLAT requires the Requested State to pro-
vide copies of any documents or official records to the Re-
quested State to the same extent that such copies would be avail-
able to the authorities of the Requested State, but, under certain
circumstances, reserves a right of denial.290 The treaty permits
the voluntary invitation of a person in the Requested State to
appear in the Requesting State291 and transfer of persons in cus-
tody, with the consent of such person and the Requested
State.292 The drafters also inserted specific provisions for service
of documents and search and seizure procedures. 293 Article'13
289. Id. art. 8(4). Article 8(4) states:
A claim by a person.., of immunity, incapacity, or privilege under the laws of
the Requested State shall be resolved by the judicial authorities of the Re-
quested State. However, if such person asserts a claim of immunity, incapacity,
or privilege under laws of the Requesting State, the testimony or evidence
shall nonetheless be taken and the claim made known to the Central Author-
ity of the Requesting State for resolution by the authorities of that State.
Id.
290. Id. art. 9(2). Article 9(2) states:
The Requested State may provide copies of any documents, records, or infor-
mation recorded in any form which are in the possession of a governmental or
judicial authority in that State but which are not publicly available, to the same
extent and under the same conditions as such copies would be available to its
own law enforcement or judicial authorities. The Requested State may in its
discretion deny a request pursuant to this paragraph entirely or in part.
Id.
291. Id. art. 10. Article 10 states:
The Requested State shall invite a person in that State to appear before the
appropriate authority in the Requesting State. The Requesting State shall in-
dicate the extent to which the expenses will be paid. The Central Authority of
the Requested State shall promptly inform the [Requesting State] of the per-
son's response.
Id.
292. See id. art. 11 (1) ("A person in the custody of the Requested State whose pres-
ence in the Requesting State is needed for purposes of assistance under this Treaty shall
be transferred from the Requested State for that purpose if both the person and the
Central Authority of the Requested State consent to the transfer.").
293. See id. art. 15(1) ("The Requested State shall execute a request for the search,
seizure, and delivery of any item, including but not limited to any document, record, or
article of evidence, to the Requesting State if the request includes the information justi-
fying such action under the laws of the Requested State"); see also id. art 15(2) ("If
required by the Central Authority of the Requesting State, every official of the Re-
quested State who has had custody of a seized item shall certify ... the continuity of
custody, the identify of the item, and the integrity of its condition.").
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of the Hungarian MLAT requires the Requested State to use its
best efforts to determine the location or identity of persons or
items subject to the request.294 Article 17 of the Hungarian
MLAT provides that if one party discovers that proceeds or in-
strumentalities of offenses are located in the territory of the
other party, it may so inform the Central Authority of that
party.295 The same article also requires both parties to provide
assistance, to the extent permitted by their laws, in proceedings
involving the forfeiture of the proceeds and instrumentalities of
crime.29 6 Furthermore, states can agree to share forfeited as-
sets. 29 7 Finally, Article 18 provides that the Hungarian MLAT
shall not restrict cooperation between the parties, and it can still
take place through provisions of other international agreements
or national laws. 298 The Hungarian MLAT does not limit coop-
eration to any particular criminal offenses. 2
99
294. See id. art. 13 ("The Requested State shall use its best efforts to ascertain the
location or identity of persons or items specified in the request.").
295. Id. art. 17(1). Article 17(1) states:
If the Central Authority of one Contracting Party becomes aware of proceeds
or instrumentalities of offenses which are located in the territory of the other
Party and may be forfeitable or otherwise subject to seizure under the laws of
that party, it may so inform the Central Authority of the other Party.
Id.
296. Id. art. 17(2). Article 17(2) states:
The Contracting Parties shall assist each other to the extent permitted by their
respective laws in proceedings relating to the forfeiture of the proceeds and
instrumentalities of offenses, restitution to the victims of crime, and the collec-
tion of fines imposed as sentences in criminal prosecutions. This may include
action to temporarily restrain the disposition of the proceeds or instrumentali-
ties of offenses pending further proceedings.
Id.
297. See id. art. 17(3) ("To the extent permitted by its laws and upon such terms as
it deems appropriate, either Party may transfer forfeited assets or the proceeds of their
sale to the other Party.").
298. Id. art. 18. Article 18 states:
Assistance and procedures set forth in this Treaty shall not prevent either Con-
tracting Party from granting assistance to the other Party through the provi-
sions of other international agreements to which it may be a State Party, or
through the provisions of its national laws. The Contracting Parties may also
provide assistance pursuant to any bilateral arrangement, agreement, or prac-
tice which may be applicable.
299. Id.
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II. U.S.-RUSSIAN MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND
BILATERAL COOPERATION
The United States and Russia currently have an agreement
on mutual assistance, but experts note that, compared to an
MLAT, it has significant flaws that diminish its effectiveness in
combating organized crime.3 °° Cooperation of U.S. and Russian
law enforcement agencies, however, already exists and has pro-
duced considerable results.30 1 Scholars believe that the new Rus-
sian laws can potentially lead to increasing U.S. and Russian joint
prosecution efforts aimed at members of Russian organized
crime. 302 Experts note, however, that Russian law enforcement
agencies incur serious obstacles in their fight against organized
crime and such obstacles must be overcome before genuine co-
operation can take place. 0 3
A. U.S.-Russian Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement
Russia does not extradite its own citizens when they commit
criminal acts abroad. 0 4 Moreover, the United States and the
Russian Federation currently do not have an MLAT in force.30 5
On June 30, 1995, the two countries signed an agreement con-
cerning cooperation in criminal law matters, the Mutual Legal
Assistance Agreement30 6 that entered into force on February 5,
300. MLAA, supra note 24. See Abramovsky, supra note 128, at 208-10 (analyzing
problems with Russian MLAA).
301. See Asnis, supra note 69, at 313-15 (describing cooperation between FBI and
Russian law enforcement authorities).
302. CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 157, art. 12.
303. SeeJankiewicz, supra note 106, at 250 (describing problems faced by Russian
law enforcement officers); see also J. Michael Waller & Victor J. Yasmann, Russia's Great
Criminal Revolution: The Role of the Security Services, 11 J. CoNTEMP. CiUM. JusT., No. 4
(visited Sept. 17, 1999) <http://www.afpc.org/issues/crimrev.htm> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal) (noting that corruption in law enforcement agencies
is main obstacle to of their ineffectiveness).
304. CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 157, art. 13.
305. See Corruption in Russia; Russia: Its Current Troubles and Its On-going Transforma-
tion, Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 106th Cong. (1999), available in
1999 WL 27594776 (testimony of Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State) (noting
that Russia and United States signed MLAT in June 1999, but it has neither been rati-
fied nor brought into force). Strobe Talbott believes that this MLAT "will expand and
strengthen the scope of cooperation, facilitating investigation and prosecution of trans-
national criminals." Id. A representative of the U.S. Department of State informed the
author on October 4, 1999, that the recently signed U.S.-Russian MLAT is not a public
document and has not been released.
306. See MLAA, supra note 24 (stating that MLAA was signed because of "the need
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1996 3 07 -it is intended to be a preparatory step to the eventual
conclusion of an MLAT. °s The annex to the MLAA lists specific
criminal offenses to which it applies: drug trafficking,309 money
laundering,310 organized criminal activity,311 fraud,3 12 sexual of-
fenses against children,1 3 trafficking in weapons, 14 violent
crimes against individuals, 15 other offenses covered by multilat-
eral treaties to which both Russia and the United States are sig-
natories, 316 and attempt or conspiracy to commit any of these
crimes. 317  The MLAA establishes a central authority in each
state to oversee compliance with its terms.31
to unite... efforts and strengthen cooperation between the competent authorities in
both countries to prevent and fight against crime").
307. Id.
308. See id. (stating that both governments expressed their intent "to conclude a
mutual legal assistance treaty in criminal matters as soon as possible."). The MLAA will
expire when the actual MLAT between the United States and Russia is signed. Id.; see
also id. art. 18(3) ("This agreement shall expire upon the entry into force of the mutual
legal assistance treaty on criminal matters mentioned in the preamble to the present
Agreement, unless the Parties otherwise agree.").
309. Id. annex(l). The annex states that assistance will be provided in connection
with investigating
[i]llicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including, but
not limited to all offenses having any relationship to any narcotics activity de-
scribed in the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Conven-
tion on Psychotropic Substances, the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Con-
vention, or the 1988 United Nations Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
Id.
310. See id. annex(4) (stating that "[m]oney laundering, as defined under the laws
of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, respectively").
311. See id. annex (3) (stating that "[o]rganized criminal activity and racketeering,
as defined under the laws of the United States of America and the Russian Federation,
respectively").
312. See id. annex(6) ("[f]raud; corruption involving Government officials, includ-
ing bribery").
313. See id. annex(8) ("[s]exual offenses against children, including child prostitu-
tion and child pornography").
314. See id. annex(5) ("[o]ffenses against the laws relating to control of weapons,
including nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction; explosive substances,
nuclear material, incendiary devices, or substances injurious to health").
315. See id. annex (7) ("[v]iolent crimes against individuals").
316. See id. annex(2) ("[o]ffenses encompassed in other multilateral treaties to
which both the United States and the Russian Federation are parties").
317. See id. annex(9) ([a]ny attempt or conspiracy to commit; aiding and abetting;
or participation as a principal to any of the offenses described in this Annex").
318. Id. art. 1. Article I states:
1. Each Party shall designate a Central Authority to make and receive requests
pursuant to this Agreement. 2. For the United States of America, the Central
Authority shall be the Attorney General. For the Russian Federation, in ac-
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The scope of assistance under the MLAA includes obtaining
testimony; statements and materials; providing documents,
records, and other items; serving documents; locating and iden-
tifying persons; executing searches and seizures; and other types
of assistance.3 19 The MLAA limits assistance in certain areas,
such as the military and areas related to national security.3
20
Before denying assistance, however, the Requested Party should
contact the Requesting Party to see if the latter would accept
assistance subject to limiting conditions. 21 Certain limitations
are likewise imposed by the MLAA on the use of results of exe-
cuted requests. 32
2
cordance with its legislation, the Central Authority shall be the Office of the
Procurator General of the Russian Federation. 3. The Central Authorities
shall communicate directly with one another for the purposes of this Agree-
ment.
Id.
319. Id. art. 2(2). Article 2(2) states:
Assistance shall include: (1) obtaining testimony, statements, and materials;
(2) providing documents, records, and other items; (3) serving documents;
(4) locating and identifying persons; (5) executing searches and seizures; (6)
taking actions related to immobilization and forfeiture of assets; restitution;
collection of fines; and (7) any other assistance not prohibited by the laws of
the Requested Party.
Id.
320. Id. art. 3(1). Article 3(1) states:
The Central Authority of the Requested Party may deny assistance if: (1) the
request relates to an offense under military law which would not be an offense
under ordinary criminal law; (2) the execution of the request may prejudice
the security or other essential interests of the Requested Party[;I .. .(4) the
request is not made in conformity with the provisions of this Agreement.
Id. The MLAA does not define security or other essential interests. Id.
321. See id. art. 3(2) ("Before denying assistance... Requested Party shall consult
with the Central Authority of the Requesting Party to consider whether assistance can
be given subject to such conditions as it deems necessary. If the Requesting Party ac-
cepts assistance subject to these conditions, it shall comply with them."); see also id. art.
3(3) ("If the Central Authority of the Requested Party denies assistance, it shall inform
the Central Authority of the Requesting Party of the reasons for the denial.").
322. Id. art. 7. Article 7 states:
1. The Central Authority of the Requested Party may request that the Request-
ing Party not use the product of the execution of a request obtained under
this Agreement for purposes other than those described in the request with-
out the prior consent of the Central Authority of the Requested Party. In such
cases, the Requesting Party shall comply with such limitations on use of the
products of the executed request. 2. The Central Authority of the Requested
Party may request from the Central Authority of the Requesting Party that the
product of the execution of a request furnished under this Agreement be kept
confidential or be used only subject to terms and conditions it may specify. If
the Requesting Party accepts the product of the execution of a request subject
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There are, however, a few substantial differences between
the MLAA and an MLAT.323 First, unlike an MLAT, the MLAA
has a very narrow focus: it is limited to the specific offenses
listed in it. 324 One expert has noted that while it does include
the most important and typical types of crime, such as narcotic
drugs trafficking, organized criminal activity and racketeering,
money laundering, armstrafficking, including weapons of mass
destruction, fraud, and violent crime, its specificity creates
problems for authorities dealing with Russian organized
crime. 25  As explained above, Russian organized criminal
groups participate in an unlimited variety of illegal activities
around the world, and it is impossible to list all of them in a
single agreement.3 26 The second difference between this agree-
ment and an MLAT is the dual criminality provision 32 7-in order
for the assistance to be provided, the offense subject to the re-
quest must be a criminal offense under the laws of both states.3 28
Even with the adoption of the Criminal Code, which contains
provisions designed to combat the spread of organized crime
and criminal activities, some of the offenses do not overlap, and
therefore do not fall within the MLAA's scope. 29
to such conditions, the Requesting Party shall use its best efforts to comply
with the conditions. 3. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the use or disclo-
sure of the product of the execution of the request to the extent that there is
an obligation to do so under the Constitution or laws of the Requesting Party
in a criminal prosecution. The Central Authority of the Requesting Party shall
notify the Requested Party in advance of any possible or proposed disclosure.
Id.
323. See generally Abramovsky, supra note 128, at 208-10 (stating that while MLAA is
important step in U.S.-Russian cooperation, it contains numerous deficiencies that
could be corrected by MLAT).
324. See MLAA, supra note 24, art. 2(1) ("In accordance with this Agreement, mu-
tual assistance shall be provided in connection with the investigation, criminal prosecu-
tion, and prevention of offenses described in the Annex to this Agreement").
325. See Abramovsky, supra note 128, at 210 (stating that "the broad scope of Rus-
sian criminal activity requires a broadly focused treaty").
326. See id. (noting that Russian organized crime in United States engages in un-
limited number of criminal activities).
327. See MLAA, supra note 24, art. 3(1)(3) ("The Central Authority of the Re-
quested Party may deny assistance if . .. the conduct in connection with which the
request is received would not constitute an offense under the laws of the Requested
State").
328. See Abramovsky, supra note 128, at 208-10 (noting that treaties usually contain
safeguards to prevent lack of dual criminality provisions from being used by non-demo-
cratic governments as political tool to persecute their citizens living abroad).
329. See id. at 209 (stating that "corrupt enterprises operating in the United States
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There are, in addition, other smaller differences between
the MIAA and an MLAT. ° The MLAA dictates that assistance
in forfeiture proceedings, related to the confiscation of proceeds
and instrumentalities of criminal offenses, take place according
to the laws of the Requested Party."3' Unlike a typical MLAT, the
MLAA neither includes a political offense exception,8 2 nor does
it include a provision that enables the MLAA to be superior in
application to the existing local laws.333 Additionally, practition-
ers note that the MLAA does not clearly define what types of
assistance are expected of the parties and it fails to enumerate
what types of financial information can be requested by each
state.3
34
B. U.S. Law Enforcement in Moscow
Some cooperation between law enforcement authorities in
the United States and Russia is already taking place.
335 Most of
the present U.S.-Russian cooperation occurs between Russian
law enforcement authorities and the FBI.3 36 On July 4, 1994, the
FBI opened a legal attache office in Moscow, 3 37 with the aim of
and Russia may not fall within the purview of the Agreement if their members commit
no acts specifically criminalized within the Russian Federation.").
330. Id. at 208-10.
331. MLAA, supra note 24, art. 15. Article 15 states:
If the Central Authority of one Party becomes aware of proceeds or instrumen-
talities of offenses which are located in the territory of the other Party and may
be forfeitable or otherwise subject to seizure under the laws of that Party, it
may so inform the Central Authority of the other Party .... Each authority
shall issue its decision in accordance with its laws, and its Central Authority
shall report to the other Party on the decision .... The Party that has custody
over proceeds or instrumentalities of offenses shall dispose of them in accord-
ance with its laws.
Id.
332. Abramovsky, supra note 128, at 208-09; see Louis Rene Beres, The Legal Mean-
ing of Terrorism for the Militayy Commander, 11 CONN.J. INr'L L. 1, 18 n.63 (1995) (noting
that such exception would permit requested party not to render assistance in prosecut-
ing offenses that are political in nature).
333. See Abramovsky, supra note 128, at 210 (noting that Swiss MLAT has such
provision in regard to local banking laws).
334. See id. at 211 (noting that MLAT would require reporting suspicious banking
transactions even without request from contracting state).
335. See generally Peter, supra note 19 (describing three-day visit of Freeh to Mos-
cow in November 1997). During his visit, Freeh addressed the danger of terrorist
groups obtaining nuclear materials. Id.
336. See generally Asnis, supra note 69, at 313-15 (describing FBI's plans to fight
Russian organized criminal organizations in Moscow).
337. See Freeh Opens Moscow Office of FBI, Visits Lubyanka, BOSTON GLOBE, July 5,
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facilitating the flow of information about criminal activities in
the United States and the Russian Federation between the FBI
and the Interior Ministry of Russia . 3 8 The office opened with a
caseload of approximately thirty-five cases, which increased to
284 by 1997, covering about 150 leads from FBI investigations in
the United States. 39 According to Freeh, the objective of the
FBI office in the Russian capital is not only to combat Russian-
related crime in the United States,34 ° but also to focus on Rus-
sian organized crime's activities against U.S. businessmen operat-
ing in Russia. 41
Just two days after opening the FBI office in Moscow, Freeh
and Russian Interior Minister Viktor Yerin signed an informal
cooperation agreement to combat organized crime.3 42 The con-
tents of the accord were secret, 343 but it supposedly called for
specific cooperation measures, such as an exchange of informa-
tion among police forces, cooperation in investigations, deten-
tion of alleged criminals in each other's jurisdictions, and the
1994, at 2 (noting that Freeh became first FBI director to visit Moscow). Two special
agents were assigned to the FBI office in Moscow. Id.; see also Wendy Sloane, FBI's
Moscow Mission: The Mob, Nuclear Theft, CHRIST. SCI. MONITOR, July 5, 1994, at 6 (quot-
ing Freeh as stating that "[u]nlike in the United States, where it took the FBI 50 years to
acknowledge the existence of organized crime, the [Interior Minister] and the govern-
ment [in Russia] have moved very quickly to acknowledge the problem."). Freeh's visit
to Moscow was part of his 10-day visit in Eastern and Central Europe. Sloane, supra.
338. SeeJohn lams, FBI Chief Signs Protocol; Agents To Be Assigned to Moscow, AsSOCI-
ATED PRESS, July 5, 1994, available in 1994 WL 10116604 (quoting Freeh as stating that
"[t]he borders between our countries with respect to criminals is [sic] very transparent.
Money as well as criminal activity flows freely between them.").
339. See International Organized Crime and Global Terrorism: Hearings Before the House
Comm. On International Relations, 105th Cong. 59-60 (1997) (statement of LouisJ. Freeh,
Director, FBI) (explaining that decision to open FBI office in Moscow was related to
increasing number of Russian-related crimes in United States).
340. See id. (noting that problem of Russian organized crime is more extensive
than FBI initially believed).
341. SeeJulia Rubin, Deadly Battle To Make It in Moscow, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 25,
1996, available in 1996 WL 11103041 (describing dangers that await U.S. businessmen
in Russian capital). A good example is the murder of Paul Tatum, the Oklahoman
businessman gunned down with a Kalashnikov assault rifle in Moscow on November 3,
1996, minutes after leaving his apartment at the Radisson-Slaanskaya Hotel. Id. The
alleged motive for the murder was that the "Moscow business community [was] tired of
Tatum and his blizzard of publicity." Id.
342. See Jonas Bernstein, U.S., Russia Sign Anti-Gangster Pact; Information on Organ-
ized Crime To Be Shared by Both Countries, WASH. TIMES, July 6, 1994, at A12 (noting that
Freeh also invited Viktor Yerin to United States to meet with U.S. law enforcement
officials).
343. See Asnis, supra note 69, at 314 n.71 (stating that actual language of agree-
ment was classified).
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training of Russian police officers in the FBI's more modern po-
lice techniques.344 Freeh reiterated that special cooperation is
needed, especially due to the potential sale and diversion of nu-
clear materials by Russian criminal groups.345
During the 1995 fiscal year, the FBI trained 4400 foreign
personnel, including law enforcement officers from Russia.3 4 6
The U.S. Congress established an Interagency Working Group,
which has recommended training and other valuable tactics that
law enforcement officials received in the Russian Federation, re-
publics of the former Soviet Union, and other Eastern European
countries.347 Moreover, in 1995 the U.S. government opened
the International Law Enforcement Academy, a training school
for law enforcement personnel in Budapest, Hungary.3 48 Law
enforcement officers from nations such as Russia, Hungary, and
Czech Republic go through an eight-week professional pro-
gram. 3
49
Practical Case Training, an on-the-job training program, has
also become an important cooperative effort between the FBI
344. Id., at 314. See Lee Hockstader, U.S., Russia Set Joint Crime Fight; Freeh, in Mos-
cow, Signs Agreement, WASH. POST, July 6, 1994, at A22 (noting that this non-binding
agreement was preliminary step to MLAT).
345. See Asnis, supra note 69, at 314-15 (quoting Freeh as stating that both coun-
tries should be concerned "about the potential sale and diversion of nuclear materials
by and among Russian/Eurasian groups").
346. See The Threat ftom Russian Organized Crime: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
International Relations, 104th Cong. 58 (1996) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director,
FBI) (noting that such training is critical to law enforcement agencies of newly democ-
ratized nations).
347. See id. at 62-66 (quoting Freeh as stating that "this has been a successful en-
deavor that greatly assists us in the proper coordination of our training efforts
abroad."). The FBI participates as a member of the Interagency Working Group and
helps to carry out its programs. Id.
348. See Christian Caryl, The Very Long Arm of American Law: A "Forward Defense"
Against Organized Crime, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 7, 1997, at 49 (noting that train-
ees arrive from many European and Euroasian former Communist-bloc countries).
Many students already have significant police experience, but lack the experience of
law enforcement within a democratic society. Id. As one FBI special agent reiterated,
"If you were a cop in one of these places in the old days, all you had to do was figure out
where the criminals were, and then you went there and broke down the door and got
'em. You didn't have to worry about warrants and judges and procedures." Id.
349. See id. (quoting FBI official in charge of international efforts as saying that
"[nlow we can draw on people who know how [the gangs] think and how they work.
We have Russian police officers coming over here and working in FBI cars with us on
surveillance."). The Academy has an annual budget of US$3 million. Id.; see also Freeh,
supra note 346, at 58 (stating that three classes of mid-level police officers graduated
from Hungarian Academy in first year of its existence).
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and the Russian government. 350 The program provides for inter-
national police entities and FBI agents to work together on in-
vestigations of mutual interest.351 It was under this program that
the Russian Federation Ministry of the Interior officers traveled
to New York to participate in an investigation and trial of
Ivankov. 52
C. Possibility for Joint Prosecutions
The refusal of the Russian government to extradite its
criminals makes the prosecution of members of Russian organ-
ized crime in the United States more difficult, as many of them
may flee back to Russia after committing criminal acts abroad. 53
On the other hand, Article 12 of the Criminal Code allows the
prosecution and incarceration of Russian citizens for commit-
ting criminal acts abroad.35 4 To fall within Article 12's proscrip-
tions, the criminal act must satisfy the dual criminality require-
ment,35 5 and the person(s) charged cannot have been convicted
of the offense underlying the charge in the requesting coun-
try.356 The sentence imposed under Article 12 cannot exceed
the maximum sentence provided by the state where the offense
was committed. 57 Furthermore, Article 12 provides for prosecu-
tion under the Criminal Code of servicemen who commit crimi-
nal acts in another country if the underlying act is not governed
by any international treaty signed by the Russian Federation. 58
Finally, the Criminal Code provides that non-Russian citizens
and stateless persons, who are not permanent residents of the
Russian Federation, may be prosecuted in Russia for criminal
acts committed in other countries if their crimes were directed
against the interests of the Russian Federation or if they fall
350. See Freeh, supra note 339, at 63-64 (testimony of LouisJ. Freeh, Director, FBI)
(noting that this program resulted in several successful investigations).
351. Id.
352. See id. at 64 (quoting Freeh as stating that participation of Russian officials
aided investigation of Ivankov).
353. CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 157, art. 13.
354. See id. (stating that Article 12 applies to citizens of Russian Federation and
stateless permanent residents of Russian Federation, who have committed criminal acts
abroad).
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
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under any international treaty signed by the Russian Federa-
tion-assuming that they have not been convicted in a foreign
state.
3 59
One scholar notes that the legal environment created by the
Criminal Code is similar to that which exists between the United
States and Israel, which also does not extradite its own nation-
als.3 6° A provision similar to Article 12 of the Criminal Code has
allowed Israel and the United States to conduct informal law en-
forcement cooperation and joint prosecutions of members of or-
ganized crime. 6 1 Despite numerous potential problems, the
U.S.-Israeli model could be very helpful in fighting Russian or-
ganized crime and, therefore, should be something that law en-
forcement officials on both sides should carefully examine. 62
D. Obstacles to a U.S.-Russian MLAT
Practitioners note that one of the major problems in deal-
ing with Russia is cultural.363 While years of perestroyka and de-
mocratization have brought the United States and Russia to-
gether,364 much distrust between the two nations persists, and
Russians may view the increasing role of U.S. prosecutors and
law enforcement authorities as an infringement on Russian sov-
359. Id.
360. See Abramovsky, supra note 128, at 213 (noting that, despite Israel's refusal to
extradite its nationals, the United States and Israel cooperate in prosecution of interna-
tional crime figures).
361. See id. (briefly discussing cases of U.S.-Israeli joint prosecution efforts).
362. See generally id. at 214-15 (noting that potential problems of prosecuting Rus-
sian nationals in Russian Federation for crimes committed abroad include inadequacy
of Russian criminal laws and corruption of law enforcement authorities).
363. See generally LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 29, at 7-17 (quoting Marquis de
Custine, who in 19th century wrote, "[t]he more I see of Russia, the more I approve the
conduct of the Emperor in forbidding his subjects to travel, and in rendering access to
his own country difficult to foreigners. The political system of Russia could not survive
twenty years' free communication with the rest of Europe."). Pyotr Chaadayev, a 19th
century Russian writer and philosopher, declared, "We do not belong to any of the
great families of mankind, neither to the East nor to the West." Id. at 8; see also
LUDMILLA ALEXEYEVA & PAUL GOLDBERG, THE THAw GENERATION, COMING OF AGE IN THE
POST-STAtUN ERA 38-40 (Pitt. U. Press 1993) (giving examples of Russian anti-Western
attitudes). Anti-Western campaigns in the Soviet Union included the renaming of
French bread into "City" bread and of a candy called the "American Nut" into "South-
ern Nut." ALEXEYEVA & GOLDBERG, supra, at 38. At one point, the Soviet government
forbade its citizens to read books written by foreign authors. Id.
364. See Abramovsky, supra note 128, at 202 (noting that since 1991 U.S. and Rus-
sian law enforcement authorities have been developing professional relationships).
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ereignty.3 61 On the more practical side, practitioners believe
that the history of distrust and hostility brought by the Cold War
has lead to U.S. and Russian authorities having very little chance
to develop informal contacts. 3 66 In addition, experts note that
while, for example, the United States and Israel have somewhat
different legal systems, they are both, unlike the Russian legal
system, based upon the English common law.367 Finally, there
are no established legal professionals in Russia, as most of the
lawyers and prosecutors there were trained in Soviet schools, and
have very little or no experience concerning the law as it exists in
a democratic society.368  Practitioners note that Russia has an
inefficient legal system, and can hardly be counted upon to ef-
fectively combat Russian organized crime.369 In 1996, Issai
Sukharev, a senior official in the Russian Ministry of Justice,
stated that Russia had only 22,000 lawyers, and some 180 districts
in the Russian Federation had no lawyers at all.370 This lack of
experienced legal professionals is problematic, especially taking
into account the difficulty and complexity of prosecuting organ-
ized criminal group members.3 7 '
Russia's severe economic troubles worsen the problem. 72
Russian police officers often lack basic technology, such as fac-
simile machines and even telephones, and simply cannot afford
365. See Vassalo, supra note 54, at 188 (noting that MLAT does in fact restrict law-
enforcement sovereignty of state authorities).
366. See Abramovsky, supra note 128, at 201 (noting that no formal law-enforce-
ment treaty relationship existed between Soviet Union and United States). Experts be-
lieve that informal contacts are very important in conducting joint prosecution and
evidence-gathering. Id. at 202. U.S. and Russian law enforcement authorities have dif-
ficulty implementing joint law enforcement measures in absence of formal extradition
and MLATs. Id. at 201.
367. See Abramovsky, supra note 215, at 1912 (describing Israeli system of criminal
procedure).
368. See Cormaney, supra note 30, at 311 n.240 (noting that sole requirement for
practicing law in Russia is graduation from law school).
369. See id. (noting that understaffed Russian judges often face threats of vio-
lence). In 1994, Russian district judges were making the equivalent of US$75-100 per
month. Id. at 311 n.236.
370. See Natyalya Gamayunova, Troubles with Lawyers, Moscow TIMEs, Feb. 2, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Libr., ARCNWS (noting that number of lawyers in United
States and Germany were 400,000 and 60,000, respectively).
371. See Cormaney, supra note 30, at 303 (noting that Russia does not have legal
professionals sufficiently competent to implement complex criminal statutes).
372. See generally Jankiewicz, supra note 106, at 250 (describing law enforcement
problems stemming from lack of financial resources).
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sophisticated investigative equipment. 73 The Russian govern-
ment lacks the resources to hire new and able investigators, to
buy automobiles and fill them with gasoline, or to purchase es-
sential computer equipment.374 Sometimes police officers have
to hail taxi cabs or use public transportation to conduct surveil-
lance or follow suspects. 375
Commentators believe that complicating these problems is
the unwillingness of Russian authorities to investigate organized
criminal activity.376 There is evidence of highly ranked govern-
mental officials and military officers being involved in organized
crime.3 77 Corruption among law enforcement authorities is on
the rise, with police officials in Moscow reporting that as much
as ninety-five percent of the police force is being bribed. 7
Some of the younger police officers consider the bribes as the
main reason to join the force. 79 Police corruption has reached
a level so high that organized crime figures can sometimes or-
373. See id. (noting that lack of national criminal history record-keeping makes
combating crime even more difficult).
374. Id.
375. See id. (noting that certain parts of Russia do not have any investigators).
376. See generally LAVARD & PARKER, supra note 29, at 161-63 (quoting one Russian
source stating that "the Moscow city authorities are the most corrupt government that
has ever existed"). In July 1993, a Russian businessman in Germany supplied the wives
of a Russian security minister and a deputy interior minister with US$350,000 worth of
goods, such as perfumes, watches, and fur coats. Id. at 161-62. The security minister,
Viktor Barannikov, was consequently fired. Id. at 162. Corruption also negatively af-
fected Russian privatization programs. Id.
377. See Woolsey, supra note 141, at 81 (noting that these individuals possess skills
that increase power of organized criminal groups).
378. LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 29, at 167. The Moscow police chief claimed
that
[elvery criminal has high connections in the police and officialdom. I would
guess that about 90 percent of the militiamen who operate out of local police
stations in this city are on the take. It gets a little better as you go up the line:
maybe about 15 percent of the middle-ranking police bureaucracy are on the
take.
Id; see also Jankiewicz, supra note 106, at 250 (noting that corruption adds to already
existing disadvantage of criminal figures being better equipped and supported than
their governmental adversaries).
379. See LAVARD & PARKER, supra note 29, at 167 (noting that in mid-1993 govern-
ment paid policemen equivalent of US$30 per month). As the authorities did not do a
background check on new recruits, the criminal world could send their members to
become policemen. Id. In 1992, more than 2000 policemen were charged with crimi-
nal offenses. Id.
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ganize parties for jailed colleagues. 3 ° This situation has led
some legal experts to claim that Russian law enforcement agen-
cies and intelligence services, instead of fulfilling their role of
combating organized crime, have themselves become part of the
problem due to their penetration by criminal elements and their
use of crime as an instrument of state policy. 3 1 Corrupted by
organized crime, some law enforcement employees are now
either personally involved or just turn their eyes away from
money laundering, drug smuggling, and continued theft of
Western business and financial information.8 2
The recent case of money laundering at the Bank of New
York demonstrated how corruption in Russian law enforcement
agencies complicates international and bilateral cooperation in
the fight against Russian organized crime. U.S. law enforce
ment officials refused to share information with their Russian
counterparts due to fears that Russian officials could not be
trusted with secret information, and it would quickly reach the
people being investigated.3 4 At the same time, the investigators
admitted that Russian help will be essential to prove that money
had originated from criminal activity, provided that investigation
will lead to charges against the suspects. 38 5 At the same time, the
380. See Cormaney, supra note 30, at 250 (noting that criminals have better equip-
ment than law enforcement authorities investigating them).
381. See Waller & Yasmann, supra note 303 (stating that internal crime and corrup-
tion represent biggest threats to Russian society). The authors note that members of
Russian law enforcement authorities participate in a variety of organized criminal activi-
ties, such as illegal privatization, money laundering, and drug smuggling. Id. Russian
parliamentary investigators noted after interviewing Russian security officers that
"[t]hey have no understanding in their minds that they are serving the constitution or
the law; they have no reverence for the rule of law and citizens' rights." Id.
382. See id. (noting that government corruption is rated as greater threat to Rus-
sia's economic well-being than decline of industrial output and growth of organized
crime).
383. See Jesse Angelo, Money-Laundry Probers Say Nyet to Russian Help, N.Y. POST,
Sept. 1, 1999, at 7 (noting that U.S. investigators refuse to share information with Rus-
sian colleagues).
384. See id. (quoting one U.S. intelligence source saying that "[t]he feeling is that
[Russians] cannot be trusted to keep intelligence secret"). U.S. and British probers also
fear that Russians may supply incorrect information to protect their political bosses.
Id.; see also Caryl, supra note 348, at 50 (noting that FBI is suspicious of Russian law
enforcement agencies' request for information without clear justification).
385. See id. (noting existence of reports that link Russian President Yeltsin to scan-
dal in New York). Russia's top prosecutor recently ordered the Federal Security Service
of the Russian Federation to look into the matter. Id.; see also Jesse Angelo, Russian:
FBI's Got Proof on BNY, N.Y. POST, Sept. 21, 1999, at 46 (stating that U.S. prosecutors
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Federal Security Service, Russia's intelligence agency, refused
U.S. requests to provide bank statements and other documents
related to the Bank of New York investigation."8 6 This refusal
came despite assurances from Russian public officials that Russia
was willing to cooperate with U.S. authorities in the investigation
of money laundering in the Bank of New York. 87
The Russian government indirectly admitted its inability to
fight organized crime through passing the Law on Weapons in
199688 ("Law on Weapons"), which, for the first time since the
1917 Bolshevik Revolution, allowed widespread ownership of
guns.38 9 According to the newly-passed Law on Weapons, the
government can only deny gun ownership licenses to certain cat-
egories of people, such as minors, mentally ill, convicted
criminals, and those without permanent residence.39 ° Propo-
believe they will need cooperation of Russian officials). FBI agents planned to travel to
Moscow to continue investigating the money laundering probe. Angelo, supra.
386. See Jack Kelley, Russia Turns U.S. Down in Bank Probe, USA TODAY, Sept. 28,
1999, at Al (noting that request was made by U.S. Department of Justice and delivered
to Russia's Central Bank and Prosecutor's General's Office).
387. See id. (quoting Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as repeatedly stating
that Russia was cooperating with U.S. investigation). Former U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency counterterrorism chief Vincent Cannistraro stated that "[t] hey're [Russian law
enforcement officials] trying to find out what it is we know before they play." Id.; see
also Higgins, supra note 75, at A4 (quoting Igor Shabdursulov, Yeltsin's deputy chief of
staff, as stating that "[tihere are grounds to believe that this scandal has to a large
degree been inspired by circles in Russia and abroad with an aim to discredit Russia,
humiliate it and push it farther away from making important decisions on the interna-
tional arena."); Robert O'Harrow Jr., Bank Probe Seeks Help Abroad; Unsealing of Indict-
ments May Foster Sharing of Information, WASH. PosT, Oct. 7, 1999, at E3 (noting that
unsealing of first three indictments in case of Bank of New York may foster sharing of
information between U.S. and Russian law enforcement agencies). Rayburn Hesse, a
former senior policy adviser on financial crimes at the U.S. Department of State, stated
that "[a] s you determine the money distribution to other banks, to other countries, you
have to share as much information as possible." O'Harrow, supra.
388. Federal'niy Zakon ob Oruzhii (Law on Weapons), No. 150-FZ of December
13, 1996, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 51, Item 5681 [hereinafter Law on Weapons].
The Law on Weapons came into effect on July 1, 1997. Id.
389. See Charles W. Holmes, With Violent Crime on Rise, Russia Unlocks Gun Cabinet,
AUSTIN Am.-STATES., Nov. 17, 1997, at Al (noting that law still restricts types of weapons
citizens can own); see also Peter Ford, Crime-Wary Russians Get Their Guns, CHRiST. SCL
MONrrOR, Aug. 1, 1997, at 1 (quoting police lawyer stating that "[tihe state today is
unable to protect its citizens. Until the police are paid properly the problem of armed
crime is not going to be solved, and citizens will have to defend themselves."). The
number of crimes involving firearms increased from 3401 in the entire Soviet Union,
then encompassing 15 republics, in 1986, to 12,150 in Russia alone in 1995. Id.
390. Law on Weapons, supra note 388, art. 13. Article 13 states:
The right to purchase weapons of self-defense, sport and hunting rifles, signal
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nents of this law argued that bearing arms is a personal freedom,
and that it gives citizens the right to protect themselves against
the Russian crime wave.39' Opponents of the law claimed that it
would lead to the furtherance of lawlessness and guns being
used in daily quarrels. 92 Underlying the new law, however, was
an uncontested fact that the underfunded and demoralized po-
lice force cannot adequately protect Russian citizens, who must
now take the issue of personal security into their own hands.393
Scholars believe that powerful law enforcement institutions are
essential for Russia to fight organized crime, but today's Russian
law enforcement authorities are incapable of individually assum-
ing the responsibility of fighting organized crime.394
weapons .. . [is available] for citizens of the Russian Federation, who are at
least eighteen years of age, after they receive a license from local bodies of
internal affairs permitting the purchase of a certain type of weapon .... A
license for purchase of weapons shall not be granted to citizens of the Russian
Federation: who have not reached the aged set by this law; who cannot pro-
vide a medical certificate on the absence of undesirability of owning weapons;
who have been convicted of a deliberate crime; who, within one year, have
committed at least two administrative violations encroaching on public order
or established order of governance; who do not have a permanent place of
residence; who have not supplied to the bodies of internal affairs documents
confirming passage of examination on rules of safe handling of weapons and
other documents required by this law.
Id.
391. See Ford, supra note 389, at 1 (noting that parliamentary debate about new
law went along political lines, with liberal democrats supporting and conservatives op-
posing it). Nikolai Kharitonov, leader of the Russian Agrarian Party worried that
"[tihe law means that guns will be used in everyday quarrels. And it will create a situa-
tion where people will settle accounts between themselves without law orjudge. Then
no sheriff will be able to do anything." Id.
392. See id. (quoting Sergei Chuganov, Duma aid who helped to draft Law on
Weapons, as stating that "I personally oppose the idea of any civilian except a hunter
owning a gun. But on the other hand, when official organizations are unable to pro-
tect .... private individuals must have the right to defend themselves.").
393. See Holmes, supra note 389, at Al (quoting one parliamentary member stat-
ing that "I'm not saying that people should start shooting at anyone who attempts to
enter their apartment. But if the criminals know that more often than not someone
they've targeted may have a gun, perhaps that's a deterrent."). The supporters of the
law conceded that it could lead to gun accidents and domestic shootings, but these
dangers were outweighed by the right for self-defense. Id.
394. See Cormaney, supra note 30, at 300 (noting that most of well-trained law
enforcement professionals left for private employment). The biggest problem facing
the Russian law enforcement today is the absence of public support and trust. Id. As
one poll conducted in Russia showed, 73% of Russian citizens distrust the police force
and 62% distrust the Russian security service. Id. at 300 n.224.
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11. A U.S.-RUSSIAN MLAT WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE
WAY TO COMBAT RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME
Russian organized crime has posed enormous problems for
Russian society, its government, and its economy. Many believe
it to be the biggest roadblock to the Russian Federation becom-
ing a truly democratic and open nation with a strong market
economy.395 So far, unfortunately, Russian law enforcement au-
thorities have not been effective in combating organized crime.
Moreover, with the increased activities of Russian organized
criminal groups in the United States and other countries, there
is a need for increased bilateral and multilateral cooperation in
combating this problem.
The new Russian Criminal Code contains many important
provisions that have provided a significant legal basis for the seri-
ous fight against organized crime. 396 It includes provisions di-
rectly aimed at curbing the activities of organized criminal enter-
prises, and it also criminalizes the types of activities with which
such enterprises are usually associated. 97 Moreover, the MLAA
currently in force between the United States and the Russian
Federation has been an important tool in the fight against trans-
national organized crime. 9 8 It provides for direct cooperation
and legal assistance in obtaining evidence necessary for prosecu-
tion and conviction of members of organized crime.399
There is, however, a need for a stronger legal instrument
that would facilitate the U.S. and the Russian Federation's fight
against transnational organized crime, and the U.S.-Russian
MLAT would be the most effective way to address this problem
for a number of reasons. First, the MLAA, while containing im-
395. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (noting that this problem under-
mines public support for government and state institutions).
396. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text (addressing crimes of "Bandit-
ism" and "Organisation of Criminal Society (Criminal Organisation)").
397. See supra notes 195, 197-99, and accompanying text (addressing problems of
"Commission of Crime by Group of Persons, by Group of Persons by Prior Collusion, by
Organized Group, or by Criminal Society (or Criminal Organization)" and "Legalisa-
tion (or Laundering) of Monetary Means or Other Property Acquired by Illegal
Means").
398. See supra notes 24, 306, and accompanying text (stating that MLAA was
drafted to address need for legal cooperation between Russia and United States).
399. See supra note 319 and accompanying text (listing types of assistance parties
are obligated to provide in prosecution of organized of individuals suspected of crimi-
nal activities).
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portant provisions, is still only a bilateral executive agreement.
Alternatively, the U.S.-Russian MLAT, discussed and consented
to by the U.S. Congress and the Russian Duma, would have a full
force of a bilateral treaty. This statement is especially true for
Russia, with its tense political atmosphere and strong Commu-
nist and nationalist presence in the State Duma, which often op-
poses measures undertaken by President Yeltsin. The U.S.-Rus-
sian MLAT's ratification, therefore, will make cooperation under
the treaty not only more binding, but also more legitimate from
a political process perspective.
Second, the U.S.-Russian MLAT would correct the shortfalls
and the narrow scope of the MLAA.4 0 Currently, assistance
under the MLAA can be sought for prosecution of only nine of-
fenses, explicitly mentioned in the MLAA's annex.4 ' While ac-
tivities specifically listed in the MLAA are the major offenses as-
sociated with organized crime, Russian criminal groups are
multi-dimensional, and it would be very difficult to enumerate
all activities in which organized criminal groups may be in-
volved.40 2 The U.S.-Russian MLAT, on the other hand, should
remove such restrictions and require assistance in any offense
that is classified as a crime in either Russia or the United States.
This provision would also facilitate and simplify the job of both
parties' law enforcement agencies, as they will not need to fit
various activities into specific categories.
Also important would be the U.S.-Russian MLAT's provision
that would remove the dual criminality requirement currently
found in the MLA. 4 °3 Currently technical differences in defin-
ing particular criminal activities in the United States and the
Russian Federation or differences in terminology may remove an
offense from the scope of the MLAA. Moreover, there are no
comprehensive Russian laws that specifically address the prob-
lem of organized crime, and the provisions of the new Criminal
Code may not be specific enough or well-adapted to fight organ-
400. See supra notes 300, 323, 328-30, and accompanying text (highlighting differ-
ences between MLAA and MLAT).
401. See supra notes 309-17 and accompanying text (listing offenses for which co-
operation must be provided under MLAA).
402. See supra notes 325-26 and accompanying text (stating that treaty should be
broadly based to encompass wide range of organized criminal activities).
403. See supra note 327 and accompanying text (noting that assistance does not
need to be provided if activity does not constitute offense under laws of Requested
Party).
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ized criminal groups. The removal of the dual criminality provi-
sion would, therefore, enable U.S. and Russian law enforcement
authorities to use powerful anti-organized criminal statutes, such
as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,4°4
available in the United States. In addition, further legislative
measures-such as the International Crime Control Act of
1998405 and the Money Laundering Act of 1999 4 06 -are now be-
ing considered by the U.S. Congress, and if adopted, law en-
forcement agencies of both Russia and the United States would
be able to utilize them in joint prosecution of Russian organized
criminals in the United States.
It is important to note that both countries understand the
importance of cooperation in dealing with transnational organ-
ized crime. As of October 1999, the United States has MLATs in
force with twenty-six countries. 4 7 This list includes countries
that are former republics of the Soviet Union or former mem-
bers of the Eastern European Communist block, such as Hun-
gary, Lithuania, and Poland.40 8 Treaties with Ukraine, Estonia,
Latvia, Czech Republic, and Romania have been signed but are
not yet in force.40 9 MLATs with these Eastern European coun-
tries reflect their strategic importance in the growing problem of
Russian organized crime.410 In turn, Russian governmental offi-
cials are also interested in expanding its legal framework of in-
411ternational cooperation.
The insistence that simple ratification of U.S.-Russian MLAT
404. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1970).
405. See supra note 229 (noting that International Crime Control Act would allow
U.S. law enforcement agencies to seize and forfeit assets of international criminals, to
punish acts of violence committed against U.S. nationals, and to promote global coop-
eration). The International Crime Control Act consists of 50 new legislative measures,
some of which were passed by the U.S. Senate in 1998. Id. They will be resubmitted to
the U.S. Congress in late 1999. Id.
406. See id. (noting that Money Laundering Act of 1999 would make it easier for
U.S. law enforcement agents to gain access to foreign business records, would facilitate
prosecution of money laundering, and would encourage cooperation with foreign gov-
ernments).
407. See id. (listing countries with which United States has MLAT in force).
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. See supra note 253 (stating that expansion of Russian organized crime threat-
ens Eastern European countries).
411. See supra note 105 (quoting Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo as
stating that international efforts of law enforcement bodies are necessary to fight trans-
national organized crime).
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would result in full and total cooperation between the law en-
forcement authorities of both countries is overly optimistic. A
U.S.-Russian MLAT might provide a legal basis for cooperation,
but there must still be a desire to cooperate. Even with the treaty
in force, the United States and the Russian Federation will re-
main sovereign nations, and they cannot be forced to follow the
treaty's provisions. Practical problems would arise as well. For
example, Russia has failed to designate and maintain a single
point-of-contact with whom U.S. law enforcement authorities
can cooperate.41 2 In addition, other serious problems, such as
mutual mistrust-like the one currently being displayed in the
Bank of New York case-Russia's internal calamities, corruption
among governmental and law enforcement officials,41 lack of
financing, and economic problems, might thwart coopera-
tion.44 It is also reasonable to fear that the elections to the State
Duma in December 1999 and the presidential elections set to
take place next year may now be viewed by Russians as of greater
priority than organized criminal activities.
With the presence of all the problems listed above, however,
the entry into force of the U.S.-Russian MLAT is essential to fight
the spread of Russian criminal groups in the Russian Federation,
the United States, and other countries. This treaty would pro-
vide the legal framework that both countries would be obligated
to follow in the area of law enforcement. The provisions of the
U.S.-Russian MLAT would be binding, would make legal cooper-
ation obligatory, and-as such-would be a powerful tool in
controlling the spread of Russian organized crime.
CONCLUSION
Russia is no longer the empire that it was ten or fifteen years
ago, but it is still too big and too important for the rest of the
world to ignore. Organized crime is presenting Russia with
412. See supra note 229 (noting that high-level Russian authorities promised to
solve this problem by establishing special office, under Procurator General's Office, to
enhance level of cooperation).
413. See supra note 377 (stating that number of reports proves ties between Russian
military officials and members of organized criminal groups). Ties to the Russian mili-
tary facilitate organized criminal groups' access to sophisticated weapons and technol-
ogy. Id.
414. See supra notes 303, 372, 378, and accompanying text (describing numerous
problems plaguing Russian law enforcement agencies).
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enormous problems, draining the country's financial resources,
destroying its economy, and undermining the people's faith in
the democratic future of their country. The country does not
have a significant history of criminal law enforcement, and does
not possess the necessary legal measures or economic power to
address the problem of organized crime. The Russian Federa-
tion's unilateral attempts to deal with the activities of Russian
organized crime in Russia and abroad have not been successful.
Moreover, Russian organized crime has had a negative effect on
other countries, including the United States, thus making it an
international problem. As such, it requires bilateral and multi-
lateral solutions.
It is therefore all too obvious that Russia needs to secure the
help of other countries, but especially that of the United States,
in trying to eliminate its organized crime problem. Practitioners
believe that the kind of cooperation that exists between the
United Sates and the governments of Hungary, Israel, Italy, Swit-
zerland, and other nations can serve as a role model for the Rus-
sian Federation. Ratification and implementation of a U.S.-Rus-
sian MLAT is needed to address the transnational nature of Rus-
sian organized crime. It would provide the legal framework
essential for cooperation between the governments and law en-
forcement authorities of the United States and the Russian Fed-
eration.
Removal of the worldwide threat of Russian organized
crime is in both the United States' and Russia's interest, and it is
essential that the two of them work together in elimination of
the problem. Vyacheslav Ivankov's case was the first major prose-
cution of a Russian criminal figure in the United States, which
involved close cooperation between U.S. and Russian law en-
forcement agencies working together on both sides of the Atlan-
tic in search of justice. There is hope that more prosecutions,
like that of Vyacheslav Ivankov, will follow. Adoption of a U.S.-
Russian MLAT Would facilitate such cooperation, and-hope-
fully-will make it the norm rather than an exception.
